滕彪文集
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滕彪文集
·耻为盛世添顺骨
·中国时报专访:盼与政府互动 和平维权
·滕彪博士:精神家园的守望者/刘爽
·司法改良和公民维权——学而思沙龙的网谈
·学术、政治与生活——2006年12月17日做客沧海论坛在线交流记录
·黎明前的见证
·看看我们的朋友——致受难中的高智晟和他的妻子和孩子
·临沂警匪暴行录
·临沂野蛮计生事件及陈光诚案维权大事记(五——七)
·中国当代宪政主义者的困境和选择/林泽波
·通过汉语改变中国
·茶人滕彪/萧瀚
·崔英杰案:“慎杀时代”的第一个考验
·死刑、司法与中国人权
·废除死刑的中国语境——在第三届世界反死刑大会上的发言
·司法独立,和谐中国——2007年“两会”之际的公民呼吁/许志永 滕彪
·彻底改革司法才能避免滥用死刑
·崔英杰案,在多重反思中寻找契机
·从“两会”看赎回选票运动
·关于尽快将青岛市四方区政府违法拆迁行为纳入法制轨道的法律意见书
·青岛野蛮拆迁:袁薪玉被控放火和妨害公务案一审的当庭辩护意见
·维权书简·戴脚镣的舞者
·被遗忘的谎言——就《成都晚报》事件致中宣部长和教育部长的一封信
·滕彪:可怕的“冤案递增律”
·不是我不明白
·张敏:滕彪律师访美谈中国司法现状与维权
·萧洵:纸包子案记者被判刑引发强烈质疑
·自由亚洲电台:拾荒者遇上联防离奇死亡 孙志刚式悲剧首都重现?
·何亚福 王鑫海 杨支柱等:放开二胎倡议书
·临沂野蛮计生事件及陈光诚案维权大事记(八--九)
·一个案件的真相与两个案件的正义(附:“聂树斌案”到了最危急时刻!)
·滕彪、胡佳:奥运前的中国真相
·郑筱萸案扇了死刑复核程序一记耳光/滕彪 李方平
·“杀害自己孩子的民族没有未来!”
·关于李和平律师被绑架殴打致国务院、最高人民检察院、公安部、国家安全部的公开信(签名中)
·NO FIGHTS,NO RIGHTS——接受博闻社采访谈中国人权现状
·挽包遵信先生
·香港电台铿锵集:扣着脚镣跳舞的中国律师
·那些陌生的人们在我们心底哭泣——推荐一个短片
·关于邮箱被盗用的声明
·《律师法》37条:为律师准备的新陷阱
·保护维权律师,实现法治——采访法学博士滕彪律师/张程
·Six Attorneys Openly Defend Falun Gong in Chinese Court
·李和平 滕彪等:为法轮功学员辩护-宪法至上 信仰自由
·面对暴力的思考与记忆——致李和平
·专访滕彪律师:《律师法》2007修订与维权/RFA张敏
·The Real China before the Olympics/Teng Biao,Hu jia
·我们不能坐等美好的社会到来
·律师:维权人士胡佳将受到起诉
·胡佳被捕 顯示中國要在奧運之前大清場
·人权的价值与正义的利益
·抓捕胡佳意味着什么?
·关于《奥运前的中国真相》一文的说明——声援胡佳之一
·邮箱作废声明
·关于审查和改变《互联网视听节目服务管理规定》部分不适当条款的建议
·胡佳的大爱与大勇
·后极权时代的公民美德与公民责任
·狱中致爱人
·奥运和乞丐不能并存?
·滕彪李苏滨关于青岛于建利涉嫌诽谤罪案的辩护意见
·纽约时报社评:中国的爱国小将们
·回网友四书
·我们都来关注滕彪博士/王天成
·暴力带不来和平,恐怖建不成和谐——就滕彪、李和平事件感言/王德邦
·让滕彪回家、追究国保撞车肇事的法律责任、还被监控公民自由/维权网
·刘晓波:黑暗权力的颠狂——有感于滕彪被绑架
·Article 37 of the PRC Law on Lawyers: A New Trap Set for Lawyers
·Chinese lawyer missing after criticising human rights record
·Chinese Lawyer Says He Was Detained and Warned on Activism
·For Chinese activists, stakes are raised ahead of the Olympics
·To my wife, from jail/Teng Biao
·Beijing Suspends Licenses of 2 Lawyers Who Offered to Defend Tibetans in Court
·National Endowment for Democracy 2008 Democracy Awards
·获奖感言
·司法与民意——镜城突围
·Rewards and risks of a career in the legal system
·太离谱的现实感
·35个网评员对“这鸡蛋真难吃”的不同回答(转载加编辑加原创)
·Dissonance Strikes A Chord
·顺应历史潮流 实现律协直选——致全体北京律师、市司法局、市律协的呼吁
·但愿程序正义从杨佳案开始/滕彪 许志永
·维权的计算及其他
·我们对北京律协“严正声明”的回应
·网络言论自由讨论会会议纪要(上)
·网络言论自由讨论会会议纪要(下)
·Well-Known Human Rights Advocate Teng Biao Is Not Afraid
·法眼冷对三鹿门
·北京律师为自己维权风暴/亚洲周刊
·胡佳若获诺贝尔奖将推动中国人权/voa
·奥运后的中国人权
·Chinese Activist Wins Rights Prize
·我无法放弃——记一次“绑架”
·认真对待出国权
·毒奶粉:谁的危机?
·不要制造聂树斌——甘锦华抢劫案的当庭辩护词
·“独立知识分子”滕彪/刘溜
·经济观察报专访/滕彪:让我们不再恐惧
·人权:从理念到制度——纪念《世界人权宣言》60周年
·公民月刊:每一个人都可能是历史的转折点
·抵制央视、拒绝洗脑
·公民在行动
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Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State

Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State
   
   by YVONNE CHIU|
   https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/dont-aid-and-abet-chinas-surveillance-state/
   

   
   In response to: China Since Tiananmen: Not a Dream but a Nightmare
   Beijing's Tiananmen Square (image: Ablakat / shutterstock.com)
   
   
   Thirty years on from the ill-fated student protests for greater democratic participation and government accountability in Tiananmen Square, it is appropriate to sound the alarm about China’s foreseeable future, as the serious tensions there will be difficult to reconcile peaceably. Teng Biao is right that without the tightening of authoritarian rule, there would have been no Chinese economic miracle. The picture is even bleaker, however, because not only is the tradeoff substantial, but the payoff is not as great as it seems.
   
   First, the cost of this economic prosperity in human rights, basic civil liberties and protections, and the rule of law is enormous, as Teng Biao notes in his Liberty Forum essay. More disturbingly, much of that cost is being paid voluntarily, as the Chinese Communist Party has grown very clever in how it combines its use of the stick and the carrot.
   
   The gulags are still alive and well in the form of political imprisonment and “reeducation” camps, and China has dramatically increased its recent spending on internal security, which includes not just combating terrorism but also spying on journalists and dissidents and censoring online communications, such that every year in this decade, it has spent more on domestic “stability maintenance” than on the military. (Domestic security budgets for the legislature, the National People’s Congress, have since 2013 excluded spending by provincial and regional governments—the effect of which is a likely underreporting of total spending by at least 75 percent.)
   
   At the same time, much of the population also gladly participates in its own oppression. Chinese self-censor and comply with all sorts of restrictions as they chase after the higher scores and accompanying prizes of the new social credit system.
   
   One might argue that this is just a stage of development—that, after solidifying their economic gains, the growing middle class will eventually clamor for liberties and protections such as property rights and the rule of law, thus forcing party higher-ups to yield to growing democratic aspirations. This developmental notion is attractive but grossly incomplete. While economic advances play a role, the transformation of potentially comparable countries such as Taiwan and South Korea were driven by a number of other factors, including geopolitical pressures, idiosyncratic leadership (for example, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui), and religious influences (such as Methodism and Presbyterianism in South Korea), and there is no sign that China’s middle class will propel this liberalizing metamorphosis. The CCP intends this trade-off to be permanent, and the population understands this.
   
   The Price of Progress
   
   Perhaps it is a small price to pay for the massive enrichment of ordinary Chinese people since the late 1980s, which has yielded unquestionable improvements in well-being. One should not read too much into this economic miracle, however. After the upheavals and persecutions of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the country’s economy started from an extremely low base, to say the least, which helped make such rapid growth possible. Not to mention that the growth numbers themselves are suspect, and often invented.
   
   This is not to say that the economic miracle is not real. Millions of ordinary people have been lifted out of poverty, which has conferred tangible benefits in the form of extended life expectancy, expanded education, and improved quality of life for many Chinese—but the “miracle” and China’s status must be put into the proper context.
   
   The biggest factor in China’s present position as an economic powerhouse is its sheer size. Its overall GDP is about the same as that of the Eurozone, but that is achieved with four times the population. Much of China’s newly acquired status as a global economic and military superpower is an inadvertent projection of what it might become, say, 50 years from now if it sustained its astounding rate of growth (averaging 9.63 percent per year from 1989 through 2017). That is scarcely possible, however. And even if it were, China cannot maintain this pace much longer; in fact, as Teng Biao noted, its growth rate has already slowed in recent years. As the economy’s structure changes, as all the easy gains are achieved, its capacity for astounding expansion diminishes. The hard work on China’s economy still remains, and the reality is that the verdict on whether the “Beijing model” can deliver is still a long way away.
   
   What Should the International Community Do?
   
   Given the bleak outlook on China’s present and future, what should be done about this massive human rights debacle? As Teng Biao warns, opportunities for meaningful resistance are rapidly fading. To add to our pessimism, the reality of human history says that successful reforming forces must and should come primarily from within. External shocks such as a sharp global economic downtown or losing an unintended war can spur domestic agitation or revolution, but there are severe limits to what the outside world can do.
   
   This does not, however, necessitate accepting as fact China’s regional dominance, future superpower status, or domestic oppression. First, we should first recognize the nature of China and the CCP: not only the economic reality on the ground but all the state oppression that goes into making the Chinese market so attractive to foreign companies desperate to tap into it. We should also recognize the extent to which the CCP’s foreign policy is driven by domestic developments—not by concern for its people, but rather by the internal stability required to maintain its monopoly on power. Chinese rulers’ freedom from the constraints of political accountability (having to please voters) is not a stage in a theory of liberalizing development; it is meant to be a permanent condition.
   
   Second, all liberal democratic societies (or aspiring ones) should prioritize a foreign policy that is consistent with their domestic values. As I have observed elsewhere, values and principles, including self-interest, do not end at one’s border, and acquiescing to another country’s internal oppression damages one’s own domestic interests.
   
   International accommodation of the CCP is driven by the geopolitical goal of taming a potential adversary and preventing war as much as by the desire to access China’s market and resources. But accommodation will not incentivize the CCP to cooperate. In fact, maintaining the status quo or offering concessions—for example some kind of “grand bargain” involving Taiwan—do the opposite. When the international community sacrifices its own values for the sake of regional and international stability and economic growth, it only tells the CCP that it need not cooperate or reform, as it already gets what it wants by pursuing its current course.
   
   Even as countries prioritize their own self-interest, they must still distinguish between more or less trustworthy partners, between short-term coalitions of convenience and long-term alliances of like-mindedness. In this area, a country’s domestic values and practices are the most telling. While scruples may seem superfluous, even a handicap, in the anarchic world of geopolitics, shared values are not in fact an ethical luxury. Shared values are strategically prudent because there are necessarily few guarantees of reliability in the international realm, and grave dangers in failing to judge one’s partners accurately.
   
   This means calibrating one’s foreign policy to assist the liberal democracies in China’s vicinity—South Korea, Japan, and also Taiwan, which is an existing model of the kind of Confucian democracy that people hope China might one day become. Promoting one’s values abroad is not required in a Westphalian-based system of sovereign states, but the strength of a country’s domestic principles is called into question when they are blatantly disregarded by the same country in its foreign policy. It is the burden of universalistic theories and those aspiring to them to be held to a higher standard.

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