滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State]
滕彪文集
·不要忘记为争取​自由而失去自由的人们
·Testimony at CECC Hearing on China’s Crackdown on Rights Advocates
·Tiananmen at 25: China's next revolution may already be underway
·宗教自由普度共识
·"Purdue Consensus on Religious Freedom"
·Beijing urged to respect religious freedom amid ‘anti-church’ crackd
·“中共难容宗教对意识形态的消解”
·非常规威慑
·许志永自由中国公民梦不碎
·滕彪维园演讲
·Speech during the June 4th Vigil in Victoria Park in Hong Kong
·坦克辗压下的中国
·呂秉權﹕滕彪赤子心「死諫」香港
·【林忌评论】大陆没民主 香港没普选?
·曾志豪:滕彪都站出來,你呢?
·June 2014: Remembering Tiananmen: The View from Hong Kong
·The Strength to Save Oneself
·讓北京知道 要甚麼樣的未來/苹果日报
·否認屠殺的言論自由?
·Beyond Stability Maintenance-From Surveillance to Elimination/Teng bia
·从稳控模式到扫荡模式
·為自由,免於恐懼越絕壑——記滕彪談中國維權路
·就律协点名维权律师“无照”执业 滕彪答德国之声记者问
·法官如何爱国?
·滕彪给全国律协的公开信
·郑州十君子公民声援团募款倡议书
·Politics of the Death Penalty in China
·What sustains Chinese truth-tellers
·在人权灾难面前不应沉默
·From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao
·自由不是一個禮物,而是一個任務
·抱薪救火的严打政策
·习近平要回到文革吗?
·中国宪法的结构性缺陷
·25 years later, Tiananmen cause is still costly
·A Chinese activist: Out of prison but not free
·中国人权有进步吗?
·Activist lawyer vows to keep fighting for human rights
·高智晟:走出监狱却没有自由
·VOA时事大家谈:维权/维稳
·和平香港行動呼籲
·沉默的吶喊
·Head Off a Tiananmen Massacre in Hong Kong/Yang jianli,Teng Biao,Hu ji
·滕彪被中国政法大学除名 因参与新公民运动
· Ilham Tohti should get the Nobel peace prize, not life in prison
·受难的伊力哈木
·香港人不会接受一个假选举
· Chinese activist scholar Teng Biao on how Occupy Central affects main
·大陆法律人关于支持港人真普选和释放大陆声援公民的声明
·« Révolution des parapluies » contre Pékin / Teng biao
·We Stand With You
·从占领中环到伞花革命
·不可承受的革命之重
·中国维权运动的历史和现状
·Don’t Get Too Excited About the Investigation of Zhou Yongkang
·Sensing subversion, China throws the book at kids' libraries
·China’s Unstoppable Lawyers: An Interview With Teng Biao
·专访滕彪:中国那些百折不回的律师们/纽约书评
·法治還是匪治
·努力实现匪治
·Hongkong: the Unbearable Weight of the Revolution
·Courts are told what decision to make in important cases
·RISKY BUSINESS fighting for Human Rights in China
·藏族、維吾爾族、南(内)蒙古族以及漢族活動人士的聯合聲明
·A STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY FROM A TIBETAN, UYGHUR, SOUTHERN MONGOLIAN,
·The Supremacy of the Constitution, and Freedom of Religion
·如果有人倾听你对 昨夜梦境的复述(诗四首)
·China’s Empty Promise of Rule by Law
·Sensing subversion, China throws the book at kids' libraries
·VOA时事大家谈:中国司法不独立,如何进行司法改革?
·VOA时事大家谈:通奸女官员被“游街”:罪有应得还是侵犯人权?
·滕彪:中共“依法治国”的画皮
·What will this crackdown on activists do to China’s nascent civil soc
·浦志强、滕彪:李保华诉周国平名誉权纠纷案代理词
·The most dangerous job in law
·关于撤销《黑龙江省垦区条例》的建议
·Selective Blindness over China and Huamn Rights
·中共体制是一个不定时的炸弹/VOA
·滕彪在伦敦闹市被打劫
·「西方學者自我審查問題嚴重」/BBC
·CHINA'S LONG ROAD TO DEATH PENALTY REFORM
·Blood, Justice and Corruption: Why the Chinese Love Their Death Penalt
·完善我国宪法人权保护条款的建议
·计生基本国策是完全错误的
·死刑作為政治籌碼
·Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China Intensifies Crackdown/NYT
·学者滕彪等人探望基督徒母亲被殴打/RFA
·‘Did We Stand on the Side of Tank Man?’
·The Quest to Save the World's Scholars From Persecution and Death
·北京准备出手整肃海内外NGO与学术界
·时事大家谈:中国新国安法,党国不分?
·Comments on the draft law on Foreign NGO Management
·评《境外非政府组织管理法》和《国家安全法》草案
·《回到革命》亮相香港书展
·China is moving toward a new totalitarianism
·Uncivil/ The Economist
·《回到革命》编选说明、封面设计说明
·习近平为何清洗人权律师
·Why Xi Jinping is Purging China’s Human Rights Lawyers
·CCP party has an exaggerated fear of a color revolution
·維權律師享受和集權者鬥爭樂趣
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State

Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State
   
   by YVONNE CHIU|
   https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/dont-aid-and-abet-chinas-surveillance-state/
   

   
   In response to: China Since Tiananmen: Not a Dream but a Nightmare
   Beijing's Tiananmen Square (image: Ablakat / shutterstock.com)
   
   
   Thirty years on from the ill-fated student protests for greater democratic participation and government accountability in Tiananmen Square, it is appropriate to sound the alarm about China’s foreseeable future, as the serious tensions there will be difficult to reconcile peaceably. Teng Biao is right that without the tightening of authoritarian rule, there would have been no Chinese economic miracle. The picture is even bleaker, however, because not only is the tradeoff substantial, but the payoff is not as great as it seems.
   
   First, the cost of this economic prosperity in human rights, basic civil liberties and protections, and the rule of law is enormous, as Teng Biao notes in his Liberty Forum essay. More disturbingly, much of that cost is being paid voluntarily, as the Chinese Communist Party has grown very clever in how it combines its use of the stick and the carrot.
   
   The gulags are still alive and well in the form of political imprisonment and “reeducation” camps, and China has dramatically increased its recent spending on internal security, which includes not just combating terrorism but also spying on journalists and dissidents and censoring online communications, such that every year in this decade, it has spent more on domestic “stability maintenance” than on the military. (Domestic security budgets for the legislature, the National People’s Congress, have since 2013 excluded spending by provincial and regional governments—the effect of which is a likely underreporting of total spending by at least 75 percent.)
   
   At the same time, much of the population also gladly participates in its own oppression. Chinese self-censor and comply with all sorts of restrictions as they chase after the higher scores and accompanying prizes of the new social credit system.
   
   One might argue that this is just a stage of development—that, after solidifying their economic gains, the growing middle class will eventually clamor for liberties and protections such as property rights and the rule of law, thus forcing party higher-ups to yield to growing democratic aspirations. This developmental notion is attractive but grossly incomplete. While economic advances play a role, the transformation of potentially comparable countries such as Taiwan and South Korea were driven by a number of other factors, including geopolitical pressures, idiosyncratic leadership (for example, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui), and religious influences (such as Methodism and Presbyterianism in South Korea), and there is no sign that China’s middle class will propel this liberalizing metamorphosis. The CCP intends this trade-off to be permanent, and the population understands this.
   
   The Price of Progress
   
   Perhaps it is a small price to pay for the massive enrichment of ordinary Chinese people since the late 1980s, which has yielded unquestionable improvements in well-being. One should not read too much into this economic miracle, however. After the upheavals and persecutions of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the country’s economy started from an extremely low base, to say the least, which helped make such rapid growth possible. Not to mention that the growth numbers themselves are suspect, and often invented.
   
   This is not to say that the economic miracle is not real. Millions of ordinary people have been lifted out of poverty, which has conferred tangible benefits in the form of extended life expectancy, expanded education, and improved quality of life for many Chinese—but the “miracle” and China’s status must be put into the proper context.
   
   The biggest factor in China’s present position as an economic powerhouse is its sheer size. Its overall GDP is about the same as that of the Eurozone, but that is achieved with four times the population. Much of China’s newly acquired status as a global economic and military superpower is an inadvertent projection of what it might become, say, 50 years from now if it sustained its astounding rate of growth (averaging 9.63 percent per year from 1989 through 2017). That is scarcely possible, however. And even if it were, China cannot maintain this pace much longer; in fact, as Teng Biao noted, its growth rate has already slowed in recent years. As the economy’s structure changes, as all the easy gains are achieved, its capacity for astounding expansion diminishes. The hard work on China’s economy still remains, and the reality is that the verdict on whether the “Beijing model” can deliver is still a long way away.
   
   What Should the International Community Do?
   
   Given the bleak outlook on China’s present and future, what should be done about this massive human rights debacle? As Teng Biao warns, opportunities for meaningful resistance are rapidly fading. To add to our pessimism, the reality of human history says that successful reforming forces must and should come primarily from within. External shocks such as a sharp global economic downtown or losing an unintended war can spur domestic agitation or revolution, but there are severe limits to what the outside world can do.
   
   This does not, however, necessitate accepting as fact China’s regional dominance, future superpower status, or domestic oppression. First, we should first recognize the nature of China and the CCP: not only the economic reality on the ground but all the state oppression that goes into making the Chinese market so attractive to foreign companies desperate to tap into it. We should also recognize the extent to which the CCP’s foreign policy is driven by domestic developments—not by concern for its people, but rather by the internal stability required to maintain its monopoly on power. Chinese rulers’ freedom from the constraints of political accountability (having to please voters) is not a stage in a theory of liberalizing development; it is meant to be a permanent condition.
   
   Second, all liberal democratic societies (or aspiring ones) should prioritize a foreign policy that is consistent with their domestic values. As I have observed elsewhere, values and principles, including self-interest, do not end at one’s border, and acquiescing to another country’s internal oppression damages one’s own domestic interests.
   
   International accommodation of the CCP is driven by the geopolitical goal of taming a potential adversary and preventing war as much as by the desire to access China’s market and resources. But accommodation will not incentivize the CCP to cooperate. In fact, maintaining the status quo or offering concessions—for example some kind of “grand bargain” involving Taiwan—do the opposite. When the international community sacrifices its own values for the sake of regional and international stability and economic growth, it only tells the CCP that it need not cooperate or reform, as it already gets what it wants by pursuing its current course.
   
   Even as countries prioritize their own self-interest, they must still distinguish between more or less trustworthy partners, between short-term coalitions of convenience and long-term alliances of like-mindedness. In this area, a country’s domestic values and practices are the most telling. While scruples may seem superfluous, even a handicap, in the anarchic world of geopolitics, shared values are not in fact an ethical luxury. Shared values are strategically prudent because there are necessarily few guarantees of reliability in the international realm, and grave dangers in failing to judge one’s partners accurately.
   
   This means calibrating one’s foreign policy to assist the liberal democracies in China’s vicinity—South Korea, Japan, and also Taiwan, which is an existing model of the kind of Confucian democracy that people hope China might one day become. Promoting one’s values abroad is not required in a Westphalian-based system of sovereign states, but the strength of a country’s domestic principles is called into question when they are blatantly disregarded by the same country in its foreign policy. It is the burden of universalistic theories and those aspiring to them to be held to a higher standard.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场