滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State]
滕彪文集
·川普政府吁中共尊重人权 学者促弃绥靖政策
·从709维权律师审判看盘古氏公司庭审秀 习近平是圣君还是反人类罪犯
· 纪念709,推动首届中国人权律师节
·709将成为〝中国人权律师节〞
·美港台人权组织设立709中国人权律师节
·Announcing the Inaugural China Human Rights Lawyers’ Day
·关于举办首届“中国人权律师节”活动的通告
·Why the West treats China with kid gloves
·首届中国人权律师节征集漫画、海报、短视频
·“访民困境与出路”研讨会
·美国CECC中国人权听证会:中共必须被公开羞辱
·Key Moments from CECC hearing “Gagging the Lawyers”
·Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and It
·多个人权组织及欧盟呼吁取消对刘晓波的限制/VOA
·709律师节与中国人权现况
·中国人权律师节启动 在笑与泪中纪念“709”两周年
·Chinese human rights lawyers remain defiant despite crackdown
·滕彪/夏业良漫谈法律与维权进程
· 萬人簽署08憲章,為什麼唯獨重判劉曉波
·709抓捕兩週年 律師籲持續國際施壓
·挽劉曉波聯
·The Political Meaning of the Crime of “Subverting State Power”
·滕彪/夏业良:公共知识分子和自由主义
·中国民主前路研讨会/RFA
·中国流亡律师滕彪,要做黑暗中的闪电
·Selected Publications/presentations as of 2017/8
·The Costs and Risks of Fighting for Human Dignity and Freedom
·China faces split into seven parts
· A Call for Investigation Into HNA Group’s Activities in the US and L
·王全璋律师竞逐郁金香人权奖:无畏强权 勇气与付出
·〝维稳〞维到联合国?人权观察批中共
·City of Asylum -Interview
·对中共的绥靖政策已致恶果浮现
·China’s top human rights lawyer in exile to speak at Saint Michael’s
·Activist expats raise voices on China rights crackdown
·A Human Rights Lawyer Lifts the Communist Party’s Spell
·Returning to Revolution
·One-man rule? China's Xi Jinping consolidates grip on power
·劉曉波對維權律師的關注
·滕彪:中国自由民权运动与习近平时代
·Kidnap, torture, exile: Dr. Teng Biao shares his story
·維權、佔中與公民抗命
·Arrested, Assaulted and Tortured: Exiled Human Rights Lawyer Details P
·滕彪律师评论郭文贵事件的意义
·Coercive Family Planning in Linyi
·Chinese lawyers hailed as “heroes for justice”
·THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF THE DISAPPEARED
·《失踪人民共和国》
·EXEMPLARY FIGURES REPORTED BY GARIWO
·在劫难逃
·李明哲案 滕彪:陸意圖影響台灣政治籌碼
·人权律师解密北京的"水晶之夜"
·李明哲案:臺灣退無可退
·作为人类精神事件的刘晓波之死
·北京驱逐"低端"人口的制度根源
·Atrocity in the Name of the Law
·学者解析中共执政密码
·暴行,以法律的名义
·人道中国十周年纪录短片
·“中华维权律师协会”评出十佳维权律师
·中国妇权成立十周年纪念
·武统狂言背后的恐懼
·以法律名義被消失,中華失踪人民共和國
·川普公布首批人权恶棍 滕彪:震慑中共
·「蚂蚁金服」在美并购遭拒 中国官媒指不排除反制措施
·CCP is taking China towards more and more Owellian state
·中国公民社会前景:乐观还是堪忧?
·中共渗透遭美欧澳等国谴责 专家析世界格局
·Laogai, le goulag chinois
·不反思計劃生育 中國就沒有未來
·中国:溃败与希望
·Conversation on China’s human right
·Draconic Restrictions on Uyghur Cultural And Religious Freedoms
·寧添十座墳,不添一個人
· the only way seems to become more dictatorial and oppressiv
·不管藍營綠營,面對的都是「集中營
·惠台政策还是经济统战?
·专访:用李明哲案件恐吓整个台湾
·習近平進一步向毛澤
·中共專制政權威脅全世界
·新戊戌变法的变与不变
·【Documentary】China: Spies, Lies and Blackmail
·No escape: The fearful life of China's exiled dissidents
·中国异议人士逃抵西方仍难脱离中共监控威胁
·The State of Human Rights Lawyers in China
·权益组织:电视认罪—一场中国官方导演的大戏
·温良学者 正义卫士(一)
·Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really
·訪滕彪律師談中共政權對於全世界民主自由人權發展的負面影響
·中共绑架中国
·美国务院发布人权报告 点名批评中国等八国
·滕彪,温良学者 正义卫士(二)——发出不同的声音
·鸿茅药酒:中共制度之毒
·on televised confessions
·滕彪,温良学者 正义卫士(三)——挑战恶法 虽败犹荣
·温良学者 正义卫士(四)——铁骨也柔情
·温良学者 正义卫士(五)——黑暗中的闪电
·美两党议员推法案 要求调查中共渗透/NTD
·Video【Teng Biao: From 1989 to 1984】
·第二届藏港台圆桌会 中国律师表态支持自决权
·自由民主與自決權:第二屆藏港台圓桌會議
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State

Don’t Aid and Abet China’s Surveillance State
   
   by YVONNE CHIU|
   https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/dont-aid-and-abet-chinas-surveillance-state/
   

   
   In response to: China Since Tiananmen: Not a Dream but a Nightmare
   Beijing's Tiananmen Square (image: Ablakat / shutterstock.com)
   
   
   Thirty years on from the ill-fated student protests for greater democratic participation and government accountability in Tiananmen Square, it is appropriate to sound the alarm about China’s foreseeable future, as the serious tensions there will be difficult to reconcile peaceably. Teng Biao is right that without the tightening of authoritarian rule, there would have been no Chinese economic miracle. The picture is even bleaker, however, because not only is the tradeoff substantial, but the payoff is not as great as it seems.
   
   First, the cost of this economic prosperity in human rights, basic civil liberties and protections, and the rule of law is enormous, as Teng Biao notes in his Liberty Forum essay. More disturbingly, much of that cost is being paid voluntarily, as the Chinese Communist Party has grown very clever in how it combines its use of the stick and the carrot.
   
   The gulags are still alive and well in the form of political imprisonment and “reeducation” camps, and China has dramatically increased its recent spending on internal security, which includes not just combating terrorism but also spying on journalists and dissidents and censoring online communications, such that every year in this decade, it has spent more on domestic “stability maintenance” than on the military. (Domestic security budgets for the legislature, the National People’s Congress, have since 2013 excluded spending by provincial and regional governments—the effect of which is a likely underreporting of total spending by at least 75 percent.)
   
   At the same time, much of the population also gladly participates in its own oppression. Chinese self-censor and comply with all sorts of restrictions as they chase after the higher scores and accompanying prizes of the new social credit system.
   
   One might argue that this is just a stage of development—that, after solidifying their economic gains, the growing middle class will eventually clamor for liberties and protections such as property rights and the rule of law, thus forcing party higher-ups to yield to growing democratic aspirations. This developmental notion is attractive but grossly incomplete. While economic advances play a role, the transformation of potentially comparable countries such as Taiwan and South Korea were driven by a number of other factors, including geopolitical pressures, idiosyncratic leadership (for example, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui), and religious influences (such as Methodism and Presbyterianism in South Korea), and there is no sign that China’s middle class will propel this liberalizing metamorphosis. The CCP intends this trade-off to be permanent, and the population understands this.
   
   The Price of Progress
   
   Perhaps it is a small price to pay for the massive enrichment of ordinary Chinese people since the late 1980s, which has yielded unquestionable improvements in well-being. One should not read too much into this economic miracle, however. After the upheavals and persecutions of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the country’s economy started from an extremely low base, to say the least, which helped make such rapid growth possible. Not to mention that the growth numbers themselves are suspect, and often invented.
   
   This is not to say that the economic miracle is not real. Millions of ordinary people have been lifted out of poverty, which has conferred tangible benefits in the form of extended life expectancy, expanded education, and improved quality of life for many Chinese—but the “miracle” and China’s status must be put into the proper context.
   
   The biggest factor in China’s present position as an economic powerhouse is its sheer size. Its overall GDP is about the same as that of the Eurozone, but that is achieved with four times the population. Much of China’s newly acquired status as a global economic and military superpower is an inadvertent projection of what it might become, say, 50 years from now if it sustained its astounding rate of growth (averaging 9.63 percent per year from 1989 through 2017). That is scarcely possible, however. And even if it were, China cannot maintain this pace much longer; in fact, as Teng Biao noted, its growth rate has already slowed in recent years. As the economy’s structure changes, as all the easy gains are achieved, its capacity for astounding expansion diminishes. The hard work on China’s economy still remains, and the reality is that the verdict on whether the “Beijing model” can deliver is still a long way away.
   
   What Should the International Community Do?
   
   Given the bleak outlook on China’s present and future, what should be done about this massive human rights debacle? As Teng Biao warns, opportunities for meaningful resistance are rapidly fading. To add to our pessimism, the reality of human history says that successful reforming forces must and should come primarily from within. External shocks such as a sharp global economic downtown or losing an unintended war can spur domestic agitation or revolution, but there are severe limits to what the outside world can do.
   
   This does not, however, necessitate accepting as fact China’s regional dominance, future superpower status, or domestic oppression. First, we should first recognize the nature of China and the CCP: not only the economic reality on the ground but all the state oppression that goes into making the Chinese market so attractive to foreign companies desperate to tap into it. We should also recognize the extent to which the CCP’s foreign policy is driven by domestic developments—not by concern for its people, but rather by the internal stability required to maintain its monopoly on power. Chinese rulers’ freedom from the constraints of political accountability (having to please voters) is not a stage in a theory of liberalizing development; it is meant to be a permanent condition.
   
   Second, all liberal democratic societies (or aspiring ones) should prioritize a foreign policy that is consistent with their domestic values. As I have observed elsewhere, values and principles, including self-interest, do not end at one’s border, and acquiescing to another country’s internal oppression damages one’s own domestic interests.
   
   International accommodation of the CCP is driven by the geopolitical goal of taming a potential adversary and preventing war as much as by the desire to access China’s market and resources. But accommodation will not incentivize the CCP to cooperate. In fact, maintaining the status quo or offering concessions—for example some kind of “grand bargain” involving Taiwan—do the opposite. When the international community sacrifices its own values for the sake of regional and international stability and economic growth, it only tells the CCP that it need not cooperate or reform, as it already gets what it wants by pursuing its current course.
   
   Even as countries prioritize their own self-interest, they must still distinguish between more or less trustworthy partners, between short-term coalitions of convenience and long-term alliances of like-mindedness. In this area, a country’s domestic values and practices are the most telling. While scruples may seem superfluous, even a handicap, in the anarchic world of geopolitics, shared values are not in fact an ethical luxury. Shared values are strategically prudent because there are necessarily few guarantees of reliability in the international realm, and grave dangers in failing to judge one’s partners accurately.
   
   This means calibrating one’s foreign policy to assist the liberal democracies in China’s vicinity—South Korea, Japan, and also Taiwan, which is an existing model of the kind of Confucian democracy that people hope China might one day become. Promoting one’s values abroad is not required in a Westphalian-based system of sovereign states, but the strength of a country’s domestic principles is called into question when they are blatantly disregarded by the same country in its foreign policy. It is the burden of universalistic theories and those aspiring to them to be held to a higher standard.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场