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热血汉奸吴三桂
·有一种爱总是令人感动
·支那粪狗东京银座买春列传
·气吞万里如虎,生子当如陈水扁
·观支那"抗日"影视有感:日出东方,唯大日本帝国不败
·赞歌送给你我敬爱的汉奸-汉奸颂
·山姆大叔和支共的裤子就只有那么一条
·由兔兔幼稚想到的支那深层次问题
·与兔子的路线斗争
·原创:和夕阳兄---汉奸读"伟大的母爱".(文中颇多夕阳兄不喜用语,请谅) !!
·咏支那意淫之神
·说说支那的李熬,无良文人到劣等民族
·什么样的情况下支那才会彻底崩溃?
·原创:荒谬绝伦的支那猪的历史观
·原创:这个世界,又有谁不爱支那?
·2008.3.12三桂准确预言马太监将赢得选举
·是的,我毫不怀疑,整个文明世界终将匍匐在红色共产怪兽支那猪的脚下呻吟。
·小议俄罗斯
·奥运,令我气愤万分
· 温家宝这个老年痴呆患者
·三桂保守估计四川地震死亡实际至少30万人以上
·捐钱给支那的人都是脑子进水的
·支共一贯隐瞒地震预报,草菅人命
·三桂分析:这次四川地震是支共释放地下核武故意造成!@
·是到了讨论本次地震到底死多数人的时候了
· 支共匪首的“抗震救灾‘的荒谬言论
·魔鬼戴人皮面具:支共伪装尊重生命
·抗震救灾马上就要结束
·小议“多难兴邦”
·原创:本次四川地震真的无法预报吗?
·由最近北平男扑杀支那十数警察说开去
·我爱你,美国,我的母亲,我的祖国
·支共不会更改党名!
·北平奥运,熬你妈的晕。我日!
·社论:支那民主化必须从其体育崩溃开始
·向新疆共和国猛士致以最崇高敬意
·“情色海岸线”祭--点滴回忆
·悲观的看,我对美国的未来近乎绝望!
·三桂对西方自由世界纵容支共的粗浅认识
·此次全球金融危机或引发支那崩溃
·# 胡佳不可能获得诺贝尔和平奖
·保持支那的独裁专制完全符合美国的国家利益
·美国接收了太多劣等民族导致美国的衰败
·由于支那人的存在,堕落的世界必将受到神的惩罚
·讨论:我对美国的高国债有些不解
·关于二战,抛开意识形态的争执,我有2个基本观点
·三桂准确预测美国大选兼最新美国总统大选评论
·三桂版:美国国歌翻译(草稿,不断修改中)
·本次全球经济危机罪魁祸首终于找到了
·和博讯大名士Dj君谈心
·说说柴玲等“六四”英雄
·三桂对支那男生割女生头的分析
·热血汉奸论坛:汉奸美女香月专访吴三桂版主
·我觉得猪流感是支那猪弄的。
·答汉奸兄弟提问:支那猪怎么能攻打日本?
·那个yokohama,我看你就像头支那猪
·纪念64 20周年
·美国政府在给“中国人”政治避难方面是非常幼稚可笑的。
· 某种程度上说,64本质就是“中国”知识分子精英的一次“谋权运动”。
·给出“支那猪”的定义(征求意见稿)
·sb支那猪记者芮成钢无礼质问奥巴马
·96年台海危机,支共真的会攻打台湾吗?
·大肆攻击刘晓波先生的都是嫉妒的发狂的典型的支那人
·转帖:“天杀的 made in china"
·zt:野蛮愚蠢的支那文化
·还有谁能拯救自由世界
·支那强盛皆拜短视的西方所赐
·习近平,支工皇帝一代不如一代
·热汗创立,匆匆十年,昔日老友,别来无恙否
·2014.6.4: 六四25周年纪念杂谈
·支日再战,成算几何?
·你不知道台湾对支工到底有多重要!
·支工总理李克强欲“强奸”英女王
·今日六四,进来纪念一下吧
·子虚乌有的“南京大屠杀”
·"天安门母亲”的错误诉求。
·美国对支那人民犯下的滔天罪行
· 热血汉奸吴三桂分坛开张了!
·穆斯林必将统治地球,人类毫无希望
·哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难
·如果日本当年获胜,美国现在就是个打酱油的
·只有回归白人至上彻底抛弃政治正确美国才能再次伟大
·川普应习包子要求承认“一个支那”真的换来了东海南海的利益吗?
·美国再次增加549亿美元军费说明美国完全被利益集团控制
·所谓的北韩核武危机实际上就是类似外星人入侵地球的神话
·支共独裁专制集团才是六四屠杀真正的黑手
·热血汉奸群体的存在就是对支那保皇派民运和法轮功的启蒙教育
·郭文贵,本汉奸反的就是你!让你的脑残粉来咬我吧!
·郭文贵就是一个河南农民文盲惊天动地的大草包
·唐伯桥才是真正的支共特务
·指望原教旨毛派二逼文盲青年习包子变革是痴人说梦!
·郭文贵是习包子和王岐山的马仔!
·英汉对照:迄今为止,我
·公告:新热汗再次被支共攻陷,无法恢复
·英汉对照第二次日支战争真相”pdf下载
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哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难

[color=#0000FF]三桂评注: 目前为止本人看到的分析全球化最好的文章,不愧是哈佛教授,真知灼见,名不虚传。我n年前就反复强调所谓的“全球化”受惠的只有西方极少数财团和支那这样极度赤贫的奴隶制国家,哈佛教授的观点和我的观点不谋而合,他们认为西方的1%和亚洲的中产阶级是最大的受惠者,遭殃的却是广大的西方世界数量庞大的中产阶级,所以,我个人认为现在世界上所有的经济动荡和危机其万恶之源就是所谓的“全球化”,而地球人类如果足够聪明就应该把拥有十五亿奴工的支那排除出人类社会,任其自生自灭,恢复原有的生气勃勃的经济秩序,但是,西方从全球化中受益的1%的富豪们是绝对不会答应的,他们还想在他们原有的天文数字的财富上面继续锦上添花而完全不顾自由世界数以十亿计的普通百姓的生死存亡,他们已经彻底蜕变成了他们支那富豪伙伴们的同类,成了人类文明的公敌,西方这些1%的富豪们也就成了需要被文明世界人类打倒的对象。
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   Why the Global 1% and the Asian Middle Class Have Gained the Most from Globalization
   Branko Milanovic
   MAY 13, 2016

    8.95
   
   [img]哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难
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   It is by now well-known that the period from the mid-1980s to today has been the period of the greatest reshuffle of personal incomes since the Industrial Revolution. It’s also the first time that global inequality has declined in the past two hundred years. The “winners” were the middle and upper classes of the relatively poor Asian countries and the global top 1%. The (relative) “losers” were the people in the lower and middle parts of rich countries’ income distributions, according to detailed household surveys data from more than 100 countries between 1988 and 2008, put together and analyzed by Christoph Lakner and myself, as well as my book Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, which includes updated information to 2011.
   
   [img]哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难
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   Find this and other HBR graphics in our VISUAL LIBRARY
   The chart above, the Global Incidence Curve, shows the world’s population along the horizontal axis, ranked from the poorest to the richest percentile; real income gains between 1988 and 2008 (adjusted for countries’ price levels) are shown on the vertical axis.
   
   The expansion of incomes around the median of the global income distribution was so overwhelming that it ensured global inequality’s decline — despite the real income growth of the top 1% and rising national inequalities in many countries. Real incomes more than doubled between 1988 and 2011 (though the extension to 2011 is not shown in this chart), a shift that involved large swaths of people (almost a third of the world population, most of them from Asia). And although our data for the past are quite tentative and in some cases not much better than guesses, it is still the first time since 1820 that global inequality is deemed to have gone down, from approximately 69 Gini points to around 64. (On the Gini scale, 100 would be complete inequality while 0 would be complete equality).
   
   The chart can be (and was) recast in many other ways, from using market exchange rates instead of exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power parity, to calculating it over the percentiles fixed at the positions they had at the initial period (1988), but whatever adjustment one does, the essential features –the supine S shape—with the peak around the global median and the trough around the 80th -90th global percentile, remain. It is precisely the growth in the middle, fueled by the resurgent Asia, and the quasi-stagnation of incomes around the 80-90th percentile of the global income distribution where Western middle classes are, that have attracted most attention. They lead to an obvious question: does the growth of the Asian (or more generally global) middle class occur on the back of income stagnation of the Western middle classes? Or at least, are the two somehow related? The follow-up question: how long can it last?
   
   In this context it is important to make two points. First, while we cannot ever fully convincingly establish causality between the two developments (because we are dealing with multifaceted processes that are way too complicated for that), the coincidence of the two developments will lead, and has led, many people to make that conclusion. But coincidence in time is not enough.
   
   Second, there is also a plausible narrative that the roles played by imports from Asia, as well as by offshoring and foreign outsourcing, link the two developments. One may then wonder if the policies that are credited for creating the new “middle class” in China, Vietnam, Thailand, and increasingly in India might not at the same time be “impoverishing” the middle classes in the rich world. If this is the case, we ought to get used to the apparently paradoxical situation that decreasing global inequality will coexist (or may be responsible) for rising national inequalities in the rich countries.
   
   If we then visualize the world over the next 30-50 years, in which other, even poorer countries, become the “new Chinas,” the stagnation of middle-class incomes in the rich countries may continue. Sure, there would be unavoidable, difficult twists and turns in that scenario. For example, in a couple of decades China could join the rich world fully, and its then-higher wages would no longer be a “threat” to rich countries’ workers. The deindustrialization of the West and the North might have by then progressed so far that the numbers of workers affected by the new competition from the poor parts of Asia and Africa may be much fewer and thus politically less salient.
   
   But the essential tradeoff may still remain: are increasing national inequalities the “price” we (the world) pay for decreasing global inequality and poverty? Is one “good” thing linked to another “bad” thing? This is a particularly pertinent question because peoples’ income comparators (the proverbial Joneses) are mostly people from their own country, rather than any random person in the world. Thus, the positive developments reflected in lower global inequality may not be something—however happy we may be that they are taking place—that matters much, politically speaking.
   
   In a recent, unpublished paper, John E. Roemer, a political scientist at Yale University, and I propose a simple model that attempts to take into account the fact that people care about both their absolute income level as well as their relative positions in national income distributions — not global ones. The results are revealing. When we assume that people care only about their incomes, as one does in usual calculations of global inequality or as one does in a cosmopolitan view of the world (where citizenship is ignored), global inequality indeed decreases as we have described above. But when we introduce some concern with national inequality, the decline becomes less significant. When the concern is equally shared between one’s absolute income and one’s relative national position, the decline in global inequality becomes an increase.
   
   The intuition behind this result is easy to grasp. In most countries, and especially in the big ones like China, India, the United States, and Russia, national inequalities have risen. So if people are more focused on national inequality, their concerns about what is happening at home will dominate the “objective” reduction of inequality across the globe.
   
   This may be politically a more meaningful way to look at global inequality, and it leads to a somber conclusion. Even if globalization were to be associated with an absolute real income improvement for all, or almost all, and reduced global inequality, if it is also associated with rising national inequalities, the unhappiness stemming from the latter may dominate. Globalization may be “felt” to produce a more unequal world, even if it objectively does not. Then the very facts that are globally hopeful and reassuring may have domestic consequences that are the very opposite.
   
   Branko Milanovic is Lead Economist in the World Bank research group and a visiting professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. His most recent book is Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization.
   This article is about ECONOMICS
   
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   GARETT ROBERTSON 20 days ago
   
   I am more of a hobbiest in economics that a serious player, but back in school i created a model for income inequality using continuous time markov chains. I think my model can explain why we global economies in upheaval, wealth being redistributed and GINI coefficients on the rise. It all basically boils down the propensity of economic agents to buy from other agents who are wealthier than they are. At the same time, wealthy agents tend to spend disproportionally on themselves compared to the poor.

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