现实中国
[发表评论] [查看此文评论]    藏人主张
[主页]->[现实中国]->[藏人主张]->[维基解密西藏问题在美中交往中的砝码]
藏人主张
·汉藏关系:回顾与展望
·丹真宗智:抗争的力量
·为和印度而中国藏醫不認可
·长眠在雪山中的西藏孩童
·从美国的两个宗教极端派的主张得到的启发
·流亡藏人对中国人想象
·我们的民主愿景
·外交与威慑
·想象与真实的西藏
·藏族僧人因酷刑后遗症死亡
·达赖喇嘛称奥总获为时过早
蒙古内外动态
·驳“中华民族”论
·中国是否蒙古国的一部分?
·草原—被强行翻去的一页
·内蒙继续维权抗议
·中国内蒙部分地区实行戒严
·中共对内蒙抗争不会手软
·坦克镇压着草原牧民
·蒙文签字权揭开了中共语言政策的铁幕
·中国对蒙古国的新殖民主义
西藏五十年纪念
“流亡政府”
·达赖过年藏人不过年
·達賴喇嘛在西藏3 ‧ 10和平抗暴講話(全文)
·「感謝印度」是否「战略转变」?
·中共與謊言的不解之緣
·西藏流亡政府回應北京当局
·雪莲谈心念治病
·
“中国政府”
·藏族学者呼吁敏感年不要折腾
·一位藏族高干这样看西藏问题
·毛泽东预言达赖2019年回家
·青海考录公安机关特警和民警公告
·北京围堵西藏运动的新招
“西藏本土”
·西藏五十年纪念从理塘开始
·回归与坚守
·唯色著作译文推介会在巴塞罗那举行
·用发展的眼光解决西藏问题
·苏老,请闭嘴吧!
·尴尬的三月
·藏人反抗逼迫自杀
·藏中大辩论
·西藏著名作家遭中共逮捕
“中国人”
·中国人解读西藏问题
·中国大众论“藏青会”
·谈中共设立“西藏百万农奴解放纪念日”
·中国八十后一代谈西藏未来
·胡锦涛不可能解决西藏问题
·西藏文化的命運列入中國文化國際研討會
·读唯色新著《鼠年雪狮吼》
·认知误区让普通事件升级为民族冲突
“流亡社区”
·阿嘉仁波切谈西藏五十年
·拉加寺告急寺主出面呼吁
·达赖失马焉知非福
·藏人也敢说“不”字
·山雨欲来风满楼
·为何中国不高兴就玩枪?
“对比口水战”
·境内藏人回答《七问达赖喇嘛》
·达萨和北京斗智斗口
“国际视野”
·西藏倍受国际媒体关注
·BBC中文网西藏大事记
·華盛頓郵報评西藏反抗50
·没硝烟有热血的京藏战场
·西藏的战略地位
·中国涉藏宣传效果不彰
·西藏通桑德斯在香港演講
·美众院授权驻华使馆设西藏事务处
·美国国会众议院通过涉藏条文法案
“总结与展望”
·秋后算账考验国际援藏界
·谈中共的“西藏农奴解放纪念日”
·我们比西方对西藏更了解吗?
·西藏问题有解吗?
·达赖特使在欧盟外事委员会发表演说
·駁中共媒體達賴圖謀大起義
·歷史上的中藏關系
·写在第一个“农奴解放日”
·中国会取消少数民族区域自治?
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
维基解密西藏问题在美中交往中的砝码

   ¶15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s "core interests" of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could "derail" bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard "rumors" that the Dalai Lama would attend a "seminar" in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was "likely" to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to "take care" of each other’s "core interests." When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as "obstacles" or as "core interests." It did not matter whether one side "liked or disliked" such matters; rather, in a "mature, close and important" bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to "step down" over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama.
   
   ¶16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a "core issue" with the apparent expectation that others would "step back." Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.
(2010/11/30 发表)

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场