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北朝鲜疯狂发展核武器为哪般?

   北朝鲜疯狂发展核武器为哪般?

   

   
北朝鲜疯狂发展核武器为哪般?

   怒发冲冠

   

   南郭点评:胡锦涛号召向金正日流氓政权学习政治,朝鲜近日进行了一次失败的核试验,上周又决定退出六方谈判,赶走联合国核武器检查小组,重新启动核试装置。过去人们普遍认为,该流氓政权发展核武器仅旨在作为敲窄勒索的法码,其实北韩实乃患中共文革妄想偏执狂重症而已,与老毛当年的“美帝亡我之心不死”的妄想偏执狂并无两样,毛泽东为了发展原子弹不惜活活饿死近四千万中国农民;金正日同样整天向朝鲜国民宣传美帝国主义亡朝鲜之心不死,因而不惜饿死近300万人也要拼命发展核武器,其目的在于用核武恐怖恐吓世界,以便保住金家极权暴政永世长存,这才是其发展核武器的真实目的。

   中共在六方谈判中一直起着举足轻重的作用,然而长期以来,除了2003年中共曾短暂切断石油供应三天,迫使北韩回到谈判桌前之外,中共利用联合国安理会常任理事国的地位,一直反对联合国制裁朝鲜的决议,甚至在联合国最后通过的对朝鲜仅禁运奢侈品的决议之后,中共不但大量向北韩供应石油、粮食和日用商品,而且在2006年北韩核试之后增加了向北韩出口奢侈商品,实质上鼓励纵容之。但是一旦北韩真撑握核武器后,威胁最大首当其冲的乃是中国。朝鲜根本不是美国的对手,南韩日本金正日这种流氓只会欺软怕硬的流氓也不敢妄动,但恐吓要向它学习政治的胡锦涛倒是非常有可能,因此只有愚蠢如猪的胡锦涛才想得出向该妄想偏执狂政权学习政治的馊主意!

   North Korea Playing For Keeps

   Gady Epstein, 04.16.09, http://www.forbes.com

   Kim Jong Il wants to hold on to his nuclear stockpile.

   

   BEIJING -- For years, the prevailing diplomatic consensus about North Korea has been that the regime wanted nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip, not necessarily as an end in itself. Now, that consensus has blown up in everyone's face.

   "Westerners and many Chinese thought that the purpose of North Korea developing a nuclear program was to have a card to play with the international community, in order to get something it wants," says Zhang Liangui, a Korea expert at China's influential Central Party School in Beijing. "But this judgment is very wrong. The real purpose is to develop nuclear weapons, not to play cards."

   Article Controls

   This is a game-changing assessment, one that some have made before but that may now become crucial in shaping policy. North Korea watchers have long assumed that although Kim Jong Il and his regime may behave in ways we don't always understand, they are rational actors negotiating craftily to get what they need to stay in power: food, fuel and cash. But for a paranoid regime, especially an isolated one that has good reason to be paranoid, never giving up nuclear weapons may be a rational choice.

   The regime's recent failed missile test and the decisions this week to pull out of six-nation talks, kick out atomic inspectors and reopen its nuclear facilities are not absolute proof of that--every move North Korea makes, every belligerent blast of rhetoric from Pyongyang, can be interpreted in the moment as merely another bargaining ploy intended to extract payoffs. The best evidence of the regime's intentions, though, lies in its long history of actions: North Korea pursued the bomb with rigorous determination for decades and is pursuing the ability to threaten the world with nuclear-armed missiles. Why would they then give that up?

   "North Korea believes having a nuclear weapon means survival for the regime," Park Syung Je, at Seoul's Asian Strategy Institute, told me six years ago this month, when North Korean negotiators first told the U.S. during talks in Beijing that they had nuclear weapons. Park continued: "They didn't have any plans to give up their nuclear weapons program anyway. That's showing us that talking with North Korea is kind of wasting time."

   The years of six-party talks since then have resulted in inducements from the other five parties in exchange for broken promises from North Korea. The most tangible gain, a shutdown of North Korea's nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, is reversible. The talks may not have been a total waste of time, though. The region's most important player, China, has been one of the most embarrassed of the six, and could change how it approaches its nominal ally. "North Korea actually has played tricks with the other five countries," says Zhang of the Central Party School. "During the six-party talks, North Korea has not only developed nuclear weapons, but also gotten compensation. ... It is impossible to take a deal with North Korea seriously ."

   China, North Korea's chief supplier of oil and food, can help come up with a better way to contain its neighbor. Up to this point, Chinese leaders have consistently rejected tough U.N. sanctions. When they did finally accede to sanctions on luxury goods in 2006, after North Korea's test of a nuclear weapon, China actually increased its exports of luxury items to the regime, according to an analysis by Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The oil kept flowing too. The message was that there is no real penalty for misbehavior.

   This year, the Chinese leadership stood by as Pyongyang planned its "satellite launch"--which, according to a report by the International Crisis Group, came after North Korea told China it planned to "test the waters" with the Obama administration. China agreed to condemn the launch in an official joint statement from the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and was rewarded this week with North Korea's hard-line response.

   For the most part, Chinese leaders have preferred a softer approach, perhaps fearful that if the Pyongyang regime falters, they will have utter chaos on their border. That is a legitimate fear, but now, as Zhang says, Chinese leaders have to decide whether they are prepared to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea, and if not, what they are prepared to do about it.

   There is a precedent for tough measures working, though in the end, the results were not encouraging. The last time China truly exercised its leverage with North Korea was in early 2003, when China cut off an oil pipeline to its neighbor for three days. North Korea shortly agreed to come to the negotiating table. Now we know that getting North Korea to talk is far from enough.

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