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***(5)《CIF 和 FOB 合同》第四版 郭国汀主译校
·《cif与fob合同》序
·《cif与fob合同》译后记
·郭国汀译《CIF 和FOB合同》读后
·《CIF和 FOB合同》第四版 郭国汀主译校
·《CIF 和 FOB合同》郭国汀主译校 第二章 装运
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第四章 保险(王崇能译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第五章 交单和付款(高建平译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第六章 法律救济(梅欢雪译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第七章 冲突法(黄辉译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第八章 各种类型的FOB合同(陈真,王崇能,黄辉,郭国汀译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第九章 FOB交付(蔡仲翰译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十章 FOB价格条款
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十一章 付款与接受(王力耘译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十二章保险 (李小玲译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十三章 法律救济(李小玲译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十四章 法律冲突(王力耘译)
***(6)《Scrutton 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》序
·我为法学翻译辩护- 《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》译后记 
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第一章:合同的性质、效力与解释
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第二章:合同当事人
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译、朱曾杰校 第三章:代理
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第四章:租船合同
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译、朱曾杰校 第五章:作为合同的提单
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第六章:租船合同项下货物的提单
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第七章:合同条款
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第八章:陈述
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第九章:合同的履行:装船
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十章:提单作为物权凭证
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十一章:船东对承运贷物的灭失或损坏之责任
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十二章:合同的履行:航次租船
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十三章:合同的履行:卸货
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十四章:滞期费
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十五章:运费
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译、朱曾杰校 第十六章:定期租船
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第十七章:联运提单,联合运输,集装箱
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十八章:留置权
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十九章:损害赔偿
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第二十章:1971年〈海上货物运输法〉
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第二十一章:管辖权与诉讼时效
***(7)《Omay 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译校
·王海明序《Omay 海上保险的法律与保险单》
·《OMAY海上保险的法律与保险单》序
·《Omay 海上保险:法律与保险单》译后记
·朱曾杰序《OMAY海上保险的法律与保险单》
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第一章:导论
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第二章:海上保险
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第三章:船舶险I
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第四章:船舶险II
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第五章:货物风险
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第六章:货物除外责任
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第七章:碰撞责任
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第八章:战争险
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第九章:罢工、暴乱和民事骚乱
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十章:近因
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十一章:施救费用
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十二章:共同海损
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十三章:救助
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十四章:全损\实际全损
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十五章:单独海损
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十六章:代位追偿权
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十七章:重复保险与分摊
***(8)《郭国汀辩护词代理词自选集》郭国汀著
·《郭国汀辩护词、代理词自选》
·“五懂”律师多多益善--《郭国汀律师辩护词、代理词精选》序
·张思之 他扬起了风帆——序《郭国汀辩护词代理词自选集》
·张凌序《郭国汀辩护词、代理词自选》
***(9)《郭国汀海事海商论文自选》郭国汀著
·《郭国汀海商法论文自选》
***(10)《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能译郭国汀审校
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译郭国汀审校 第一章:当事人的目标
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第六章:保险问题
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第四章:信用(融资)协议
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第十章:未来
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第八章:其他法律问题
***(11)《油污和碰撞责任》郭国汀译
·《油污和碰撞责任》郭国汀译 第三编:油污 第十一章:导论
·《油污和碰撞责任》郭国汀译 第三编:油污 第十二章:船舶油污及国际公共卫生法的调整
***(12)《国际贸易法》郭国汀、陆怡、李涛译
·《国际贸易法》郭国汀、陆怡、李涛译 第六章:国际技术转让
·《国际贸易法》郭国汀、陆怡、李涛译 第七章:外国投资
***(13)《国际海事海商法》郭国汀、沈军、王崇能、冯敏译
·《国际海事海商法》郭国汀、沈军、王崇能、冯敏译 第一章:海事海商法的简明历史
·《国际海事海商法》郭国汀、沈军、王崇能、冯敏译 第五章:拖航
·《国际海事海商法》郭国汀、沈军、王崇能、冯敏译 第十章:管辖及程序
·《国际海事海商法》郭国汀、沈军、王崇能、冯敏译 第十一章:海洋污染
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The Arguments For and Against the Notwithstanding Clause

The Arguments For and Against the Notwithstanding Clause
   Thomas (Guoting)Guo
   The notwithstanding clause is a unique and famous clause of the Canadian Constitution. Since 1982, when it was adopted, arguments about it have never stopped(CTV.ca newsstaff. 2006).[1]Recently, the same sex marriage issue ignited arguments again(Charlie 2006)[2]. This essay reviews and comments on arguments for and against the clause.

   I. What is the Notwithstanding clause?
   Section 33(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows both federal and provincial legislatures to adopt legislation to override Section 2 (involving freedom of expression, conscience, association and assembly); plus sections 7-15 [(a.) the right to life, liberty and security, (b.) freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, (c.) freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, (d.) a number of other legal rights, and (e.) the right to equality]. All rights and freedoms stipulated in the Charter are guaranteed and subject to the above limitations. Consequently, the Charter is a unique combination of rights and freedoms; some are fully protected and others are entrenched unless overridden by legislatures.
   Until now, the notwithstanding clause has been used approximately 18 times, mainly in Quebec. Recently, research showed 68% of people strongly or somewhat support the notwithstanding clause(author unknown.2006.)[3] . After the Supreme Court of Canada ordered Alberta to write protection for homosexuals into its human rights legislation, thousands of citizens clamoured for the government to use the notwithstanding clause to override the court(Steel 11)[4] Thus, the majority supported the clause; however, a lot of people also demanded it be repealed.
   II . Argument For and Against the Notwithstanding Clause
   Since the notwithstanding clause was written into the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the legislative override clause of Section 33 has been a highly contested provision. Most of the controversy focuses on issues concerning the scope of power and core democratic concepts such as democracy, majority tyranny, legislative supremacy, judicial review, and judicial activism. The following are the main arguments for and against the notwithstanding clause.
   A. Arguments For Section 33
    1. To ensure the democratic ideal of government the notwithstanding clause mentions the fundamental purpose of parliamentary bodies is to facilitate the democratic ideal of government by discussion. Parliamentary bodies are important means of bringing democratic discussion of important public policy. If judges are given the last word on Charter questions, then Parliament can do nothing, and the process of democratic discussion becomes impossible. Courts and parliament have a role to play in deciding Charter issues. Further, the notwithstanding clause is crucial to this participation of parliament and processes of public discussions that democratic institutions bring with them(Jay 2007)[5].
   2. Elected legislatives, rather than un-elected judges, are best to make important policy decisions. Claims the notwithstanding clause threat individual rights are not substantial because there is a five-year limit on any use of the notwithstanding power. Any such legislative override will be subject to public debate at the time of its first enactment and at the moment of any subsequent re-enactment(David 2005)[6].
   3. Judges should not act as legislators. Judges may remain in office for many years after their appointment. If they had a greater "political" role, their non-responsibility to the electorate might well be a source of controversy because a policy-making role would compromise the independence and impartiality of the courts, and would hasten their politicization(David 2005)[7].
    4. Elected legislatives make the final political decisions and can mitigate politicization of courts. Accordingly, there is little evidence to prove Canadian Supreme Court Judges are selected according to how they would rule in various cases. Without the notwithstanding clause and courts as final arbiters of social values, society would be vulnerable to change(David 2005)[8].
   5. Legislators should have the final word on public policy matters as the "safety valve" or "unintended consequences" arguments. This suggests the notwithstanding clause is needed where a judicial decision based on Charter guarantees might result in a threat to important social values or goals. Because such rights and freedoms are generally stated, and are susceptible to varying constructions and interpretations, courts may render judgments that drafters did not anticipate(David 2005)[9].
   6. There is parliamentary sovereignty. The notwithstanding clause says legislators, unlike judges, are electorally responsible. The clause makes it possible for legislatures to correct any unfortunate judicial interpretation of the Charter.
   7. There is constitutional authority support:
    i. Professor Wayne MacKay of Dalhousie University spoke in favour of retaining the section by stating “The notwithstanding clause permits debate about which rights are fundamental in Canadian society and which should prevail when rights are in conflict. In a democratic society steeped in the tradition of parliamentary supremacy, it is proper to give our elected legislators the final word” ( A Reader's Digest June 1989. 103)[10]
    ii. Professor François Chevrette of the Université de Montréal was also in favour of retaining the clause. He pointed out that political power can override a judicial decision on an important or sensitive issue, and then there is an opportunity for national debate (A Reader's Digest June 1989.104). [11]
   B. Arguments Against Section 33
   1. Section 33 is inconsistent with entrenchment of human rights and freedoms. The notwithstanding clause says rights and freedoms are subject to judicial interpretation but must be protected against legislative transgression. When the majority of the public is in favour of limitation or elimination of rights of a minority constitutional restrictions are needed. Moreover, the Charter does not create absolute rights and freedoms, which are subject to reasonable limits prescribed by law, as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. This should permit the courts enough flexibility to adjust legislative goals that infringe a guaranteed right or freedom.(Philip 18)[12]
   2. A hierarchy of rights is created. Legislative override is applicable to only fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights; therefore, other rights such as democratic, mobility, language, minority language education, and the guaranteed equality of gender are not subject to the override. (Philip 19)[13]
   3. There is demeaning of the nature of freedoms and rights. Manning states " Rights and freedoms that can be overridden are so significant as to raise questions about the nature of the freedom that remains. If our freedom of conscience or religion can be taken away by a law, which operates notwithstanding the Charter; if our right to life or liberty can be taken not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, what freedom do we have?" (Morris 55). [14]
   4. There is majority tyranny. In a democracy, public policy is generally orientated towards opinions of the majority of citizens. As a result, democratic laws can often be unfair to minority groups (such as minority religious, ethnic, racial, or cultural groups) or other individuals outside the majority opinion. In extreme situations the majority may prosecute or force these minorities to conform to the majority view. The charter is used as a means of protecting minorities( Jay 2007)[15].
   5. Legislative supremacy broke the balance of three powers in a democratic government. Democratic governments include different branches – such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries. Legislative supremacy in a democracy means destroying the balance, which is the core value of most democratic governments.(Jay 2007)[16] The mere existence of the override power can entice governments to use it.

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