政党社团之声
[发表评论] [查看此文评论]    缅甸风云
[主页]->[政党社团之声]->[缅甸风云]->[An EU strategy for Burma ?]
BURMA-缅甸风云
·缅甸官方大谈为国为民反贪反橡皮图章
·缅甸补选点滴趣闻
·昂山素姬为何坚信登盛总统诚意改革
·昂山素姬民盟胜了不骄傲也不辱人
·少食+多菜少荤+快乐+早睡早起 =长寿
·未来吃什么?
·腦退化症
·缅甸国内外形势说变就变?
·缅甸掸族领袖如何看昂山素姬和登盛政府
·独裁者守望台对“新缅甸”的评价
·赛万赛对缅甸局势是否太乐观?
·掸公主 Sao Noan Oo 对英国有话说
·佤邦联合军保家卫邦不怕空袭
·匈牙利布达佩斯一日游
·捷克布拉格一日游
·缅军与克钦军交火不断 中国参与斡旋
·赠神州红尘众生的锵锵劝世良言
·忆10年前云南8日游
·最美教师张丽莉与日日向善的中国人民
·最美司机48岁吴斌
·普世價值的中國先知——方励之
·谈白岩松与昂山素姬为民请命
·悼六四硬汉李旺阳被“自杀”
·温教授貌强谈若开宗教种族暴乱
·谈缅甸古今大小民族主义
·1962年缅甸学生七七惨案
·缅甸前国防总长谈罗兴迦人来龙去脉
·赛万赛谈登盛政府一年多政绩
·温教授点评大缅族主义/缅甸军队
·嚴家其谈中国民主法治轉型
·掸邦众族民主联盟昆吞武讲话
·缅甸众少数民族点评停战和谈
·罗兴迦悲剧迴光返照众生相
·给8888学生领袖哥哥基的公开信
·赛万赛盛赞登盛总统最近言行
·缅甸民主同盟DAB对和解停战声明
·掸邦进步党成立41周年纪念
·缅甸2012年五大民主服务奖章得主
·缅甸联邦众土族在泰缅边境开会
·缅甸联邦众土族开会声明
·掸邦众族民主联盟主席昆吞武赴美领奖
·美国之音访问掸邦民主联盟主席昆吞武
·缅甸有了选举就成真正民主国家吗?
·赛万赛点评昂山素姬与吴登盛总统
·温教授点评昂山素姬与吴登盛总统
·廉萨空博士回缅甸参加研讨会
·赛万赛谈缅族缅邦一分为七
·鲍彤吁温总出面澄清家族财富
·缅甸若开邦又爆发新暴力冲突
·温教授痛斥大缅族主义祸国殃民
·从外援谈到非缅族众原住民的权益
·转基因与新瘟疫SARS
·中国缅甸油气管道
·美国逼中国在其中国近海包围圈开战
·缅甸南传佛教禅修法
· 中华民族复兴的四大步骤
·昂山素姬面对“中國問題”严厉考验
·未来20年两大权力转移
·马英九与昂山素姬关心刘晓波
·莫言的自述与诺贝尔委员会的评价
·襄助缅甸,中国能比美国做得更多
·神州边防武警见义勇为,海外炎黄子孙惊喜交集
·缅甸非政府众组织反对中缅油气管道与深水港
·震惊大陆法庭的法轮功辩护词
·諾貝獎得主134人聯名要求釋放劉曉波
·勿忘邓小平上世纪末10点警告
·缺维生素B2易患痔疮溃疡肿瘤癌症
·让戒定慧佛光普照缅甸大地
·热烈欢呼粟秀玉老师荣获缅甸佛学奖!
·2013年初谈缅甸缅甸人中国中国人
·缅甸中国必须互利双赢
·缅甸卑谬世界文化遗产一日游
·骠族老同学谈眼皮下缅甸红尘
·骠族老同学谈眼皮下缅甸红尘!
·缅甸政府与众少数民族半世纪内战复燃
·中缅边境军民要以正视听
·缅甸蒲甘世界文化遗产一日游(1)
·缅甸中国边民有话说
·缅甸蒲甘世界文化遗产一日游(续1)
·绝密档案 招标中标 鸡的屁
·少吃长寿送煤气炉
·缅甸海归谈缅甸中国关系
·昂山素姬弃美投华?
·铜矿村民愤概昂山素姬调查报告
·缅甸斗士海归责怪昂山素姬
·独裁观察家点评昂山素姬
·缅甸评论家奉劝昂山素姬
·于建嵘与柴静的中国梦
·美国反式脂肪与中国粮油食品奶粉
·缅甸会成卢旺达第二吗?
·中国贪官与美国梦
·诺奖得主的健康长寿秘诀
·古人的劳逸养生与食疗
·中国摩登僧尼与时俱进
·中华五千年文明遗产馆
·吴内昂谈缅甸2008年宪法与人权
·与中国渐行渐远的缅甸
·为老外所描述的中国人而痛哭
·科学地话说杨桃
·中国人为何多会早死
·奥巴马应赦免斯诺登
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
An EU strategy for Burma ?

   ========================

   S.H.A.N. & Burma's News Published by Burma's Chinese

   

   Contact & UNsubscribe: [email protected]

   Website: http://www.boxun.com/hero/Burma'sChinese

   Oct. 18, 2005

   =======================

   The autor Ham Yawnghwe is the Director of the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels. Established in 1997 to help the Burmese democracy movement prepare for a peaceful transition to democracy after four decades of military rule, the Office was a joint project of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

   The Euro-Burma Office manages the National Reconciliation Programme forBurma and in 2005, received funding from the Peace building Fund of the Canadian International Development Agency, the Danish International Development Agency, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Irish Catholic development agency.

   -------

An EU strategy for Burma/Myanmar?

   by Ham Yawnghwe

   It is difficult to talk about a European Union strategy for Burma/Myanmar when everything about the country is so politicised and polarised - be it HIV / AIDS, humanitarian aid, or drug eradication, not to mention sanctions or political engagement. A simple well-meaning action or statement can take on unintended complex consequences and draw intense criticism from all quarters. The United Nations Global Fund to combat HIV-AIDS, Tuberculosis ,and Malaria in Myanmar has become the latest victim in this 'Burma war'. It is a battle where one is more likely to be killed by 'friendly' fire than by enemy fire. The issue of a European Union strategy for Burma/Myanmar is further complicated by the question of whether the strategy should be developed and implemented by the Commissioner for External Relations, or the EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy, or the rotating EU Presidency, or the various EU Ministries of Foreign Affairs who more or less deal with Burma/Myanmar on a daily basis.

EU-Burma relations in review

   The European Union's policy towards Burma/Myanmar has unfortunately been a reactive one rather than a carefully thought through strategy. This is sadly true of the Burmese democracy movement as a whole, as well as of the international community at large. The process for the EU is perhaps complicated by the need to reach a consensus amongst the 25 member nations. When the Burmese military, then known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), seized power in 1988 killing thousands, the EU reacted by suspending all bilateral aid. When the SLORC in 1990 held general elections, lost by a landslide and decided to ignore the election results, the EU reacted by imposing an arms embargo and suspending defence co-operation in1991. With hindsight, the withdrawing of military attaches from the EU embassies in Yangon is proving to be a key weakness in EU strategy. But after the initial furore over the elections, Burma/Myanmar was again forgotten as EU companies joined others in the rush to invest in the new open 'frontier' economy. Then, in 1995, the spotlight was turned on the regime's forced labour practices by the democracy movement as a campaign against the SLORC's "Visit Myanmar Year" tourist campaign. This eventually led, in 1997, to the EU withdrawing General System of Preferences (GSP)trade privileges from Burma/Myanmar. This also led to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) taking action against the Burmese regime in November 2000. The heightened awareness created by the GSP and 'slave' labour campaigns allowed the EU to adopt its first Common Position on Burma/Myanmar in October 1996. But while the tougher EU stance was appreciated by democracy advocates everywhere, the policy was out of sync with what was actually happening politically on the ground in Yangon.

   In 1994, the SLORC had electrified the people of Burma by showing on state television, images without a sound track of democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) meeting with SLORC Chairman Sr. General Than Shwe and SLORCSecretary-1 Lieut-General Khin Nyunt. This was followed by her eventual release from house arrest in 1995. The situation was reversed towards the end of 1996 when ASSK's National League for Democracy (NLD) withdrew from the SLORC-sponsored National Convention. But in theory, the stronger EU position should have come when the SLORC-ASSK 'honeymoon' broke down. It, in fact, preceded it. From the SLORC point of view, it could perhaps be wrongly concluded that the military's 'weakness' during the 'honeymoon' period encouraged stronger measures against it. The EU Common Position was followed by an even stronger US position in 1997.

   1997 was also the year that Burma/Myanmar's became a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Prior to that, the EU could afford to have any policy it wanted without affecting any of its interests. But the issue of Burma/Myanmar became a bone of contention between the EU and ASEAN and it affected their long-tern relationship for many years. And when the EU Common Position was strengthened in October 1998, not much was added beyond widening the visa ban on Burmese officials.

   In early 2000, the now renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)launched a campaign to 'annihilate' both ASSK and the NLD. But by then, the EU no longer had any means/1eft to influence the SPDC, and in April 2000,the Council had to take the mainly symbolic action of adding to the Common Position some restrictive measures against the regime. Realising its weakened position, the Council reiterated its desire to establish a meaningful political dialogue with the SPDC and indicated that the visa ban for the Burmese Foreign Minister might be waived where this would be in the interests of the EU. This in fact, contradicted the earlier position adopted nine years previously to downgrade official contacts. But the real difficulty was not having military attaches in situ since 1991. This meant that the EU had no real channels through which it could talk with the Burmese military.

   Fortunately for all concerned, the SPDC backed off its campaign to 'annihilate' ASSK and the NLD, and instead embarked in October 2000 on 'confidential talks' with ASSK. When the 'talks' with ASSK which were 'facilitated' by the UN Special Envoy for Burma, Ambassador Razali, began to break down in 2003, the EU Common Position was strengthened once again in April 2003. But as previously, it consisted only of an extension of the scope of existing sanctions. Some including the then British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Mike O'Brien have speculated whether a relaxation of the EU position at that time might not have helped to soften the SPDC's position. But the die was probably already cast when the US refused to "certify" the SPDC's drug control efforts in February 2003.

   The EU position on Burma/Myanmar took a strange turn in 2004. Until ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar was a side issue and was becoming an irritant. But with the expansion of the EU, the expansion of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) became a crucial issue and the inclusion of Burma/Myanmar became the centre of the dispute. In a bid to influence ASEAN, the EU threatened to boycott ASEM if Burma/Myanmar was included, and in April 2004, the EU Common Position on Burma/Myanmar was extended by the Council. But when ASEAN called their bluff, the EU had to agree to Burma/Myanmar participating in the ASEM Summit, though on a level below that of Head of State or Government. As a face-saving mechanism, the EU also decided that further sanctions against the military regime would be implemented if it failed to meet certain conditions including the release of ASSK. The Council in October 2004revised the Common Position and further tightened sanctions on the SPDC.

   While the EU Common Position was renewed in April 2005, no changes were introduced. With the ASEM debacle in 2004 and the recent tension with ASEAN over Burma/Myanmar's chairmanship in 2006, it is becoming increasingly clear that the EU can no longer take its Burma/Myanmar policy for granted or act in an ad hoc fashion every time anew issue arises. While EU exports to Burma/Myanmar are negligible, totalling 54 million in 2003, and imports from Burma/Myanmar totalled only 388 million, Burma/Myanmar is becoming a major obstacle in the EU's relationship with ASEAN and its east Asian partners -namely China, Japan and South Korea. The socio-economic conditions in Burma/Myanmar are also worrying. There is a high risk of instability. Former Commissioner Chris Patten has stated that we could be witnessing the development of a failed state in Burma/Myanmar.

[下一页]

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场