滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really]
滕彪文集
·呂秉權﹕滕彪赤子心「死諫」香港
·【林忌评论】大陆没民主 香港没普选?
·曾志豪:滕彪都站出來,你呢?
·June 2014: Remembering Tiananmen: The View from Hong Kong
·The Strength to Save Oneself
·讓北京知道 要甚麼樣的未來/苹果日报
·否認屠殺的言論自由?
·Beyond Stability Maintenance-From Surveillance to Elimination/Teng bia
·从稳控模式到扫荡模式
·為自由,免於恐懼越絕壑——記滕彪談中國維權路
·就律协点名维权律师“无照”执业 滕彪答德国之声记者问
·法官如何爱国?
·滕彪给全国律协的公开信
·郑州十君子公民声援团募款倡议书
·Politics of the Death Penalty in China
·What sustains Chinese truth-tellers
·在人权灾难面前不应沉默
·From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao
·自由不是一個禮物,而是一個任務
·抱薪救火的严打政策
·习近平要回到文革吗?
·中国宪法的结构性缺陷
·25 years later, Tiananmen cause is still costly
·A Chinese activist: Out of prison but not free
·中国人权有进步吗?
·Activist lawyer vows to keep fighting for human rights
·高智晟:走出监狱却没有自由
·VOA时事大家谈:维权/维稳
·和平香港行動呼籲
·沉默的吶喊
·Head Off a Tiananmen Massacre in Hong Kong/Yang jianli,Teng Biao,Hu ji
·滕彪被中国政法大学除名 因参与新公民运动
· Ilham Tohti should get the Nobel peace prize, not life in prison
·受难的伊力哈木
·香港人不会接受一个假选举
· Chinese activist scholar Teng Biao on how Occupy Central affects main
·大陆法律人关于支持港人真普选和释放大陆声援公民的声明
·« Révolution des parapluies » contre Pékin / Teng biao
·We Stand With You
·从占领中环到伞花革命
·不可承受的革命之重
·中国维权运动的历史和现状
·Don’t Get Too Excited About the Investigation of Zhou Yongkang
·Sensing subversion, China throws the book at kids' libraries
·China’s Unstoppable Lawyers: An Interview With Teng Biao
·专访滕彪:中国那些百折不回的律师们/纽约书评
·法治還是匪治
·努力实现匪治
·Hongkong: the Unbearable Weight of the Revolution
·Courts are told what decision to make in important cases
·RISKY BUSINESS fighting for Human Rights in China
·藏族、維吾爾族、南(内)蒙古族以及漢族活動人士的聯合聲明
·A STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY FROM A TIBETAN, UYGHUR, SOUTHERN MONGOLIAN,
·The Supremacy of the Constitution, and Freedom of Religion
·如果有人倾听你对 昨夜梦境的复述(诗四首)
·China’s Empty Promise of Rule by Law
·Sensing subversion, China throws the book at kids' libraries
·VOA时事大家谈:中国司法不独立,如何进行司法改革?
·VOA时事大家谈:通奸女官员被“游街”:罪有应得还是侵犯人权?
·滕彪:中共“依法治国”的画皮
·What will this crackdown on activists do to China’s nascent civil soc
·浦志强、滕彪:李保华诉周国平名誉权纠纷案代理词
·The most dangerous job in law
·关于撤销《黑龙江省垦区条例》的建议
·Selective Blindness over China and Huamn Rights
·中共体制是一个不定时的炸弹/VOA
·滕彪在伦敦闹市被打劫
·「西方學者自我審查問題嚴重」/BBC
·CHINA'S LONG ROAD TO DEATH PENALTY REFORM
·Blood, Justice and Corruption: Why the Chinese Love Their Death Penalt
·完善我国宪法人权保护条款的建议
·计生基本国策是完全错误的
·死刑作為政治籌碼
·Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China Intensifies Crackdown/NYT
·学者滕彪等人探望基督徒母亲被殴打/RFA
·‘Did We Stand on the Side of Tank Man?’
·The Quest to Save the World's Scholars From Persecution and Death
·北京准备出手整肃海内外NGO与学术界
·时事大家谈:中国新国安法,党国不分?
·Comments on the draft law on Foreign NGO Management
·评《境外非政府组织管理法》和《国家安全法》草案
·《回到革命》亮相香港书展
·China is moving toward a new totalitarianism
·Uncivil/ The Economist
·《回到革命》编选说明、封面设计说明
·习近平为何清洗人权律师
·Why Xi Jinping is Purging China’s Human Rights Lawyers
·CCP party has an exaggerated fear of a color revolution
·維權律師享受和集權者鬥爭樂趣
·Toast at the Stateless Breakfast
·"China é responsável por 90% das execuções mundiais"
·敗訴多於勝訴的名律師(上)
·敗訴多於勝訴的名律師(下)
·China's international relations at a time of rising rule of law challe
·Seven Chinese activists wrote to the Dutch King
·七名中国民主人士致信荷兰国王
·專訪維權律師滕彪對中國法治人權的解讀
·中共的政治株连
·Dictatorship is a Decapitator, Whether it Tortures You or Treats You W
·Innocence project movement in China rises to aid the wrongfully convic
·好處沙龍【選後台灣如何面對中國巨變】
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really

http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/has-xi-jinping-changed-china-not-really
   
   Has Xi Jinping Changed China? Not Really
   April 16, 2018
   Teng Biao

   
   Teng Biao is a Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Asia Law Institute at New York University, where his research is focused on the rights defense movement in China. Teng previously was a Lecturer at China、、.
   More
   Xi Jinping has had an eventful early spring. After he abolished presidential term limits and was unanimously elected—if it can be called an election—to serve another term in that post, Xi got the world’s attention again by holding a meeting with Kim Jong-un. Xi was also in the spotlight when he addressed the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia, promising more openness in the face of a looming trade war. Many observers now seem convinced that Xi has changed China and maybe, even, the international order. But has he really?
   
   In the 70 years since the establishment of the Communist regime, numerous changes have taken place in the social, economic, legal, and psychological spheres. Yet the Party’s essential political role of leading a Party-state under strict one-Party rule has not changed, whether under collective dictatorship or a personal one. The Party’s absolute control over the military, judicial system, Congress, and bureaucracy, as well as its suppression of dissidents and activists who promote democracy, has been constant for 70 years. The Party’s control over the media, ideology, public opinion, and education—almost all of the public sphere, with the exception of the Internet—has also undergone no fundamental change. The Party also controls the economy, social groups, and religions. And while market economics, some folk activities, rights defenders, and house churches have managed to carve out a tiny space for themselves, they don’t come close to constituting a challenge to the Party. When measured against the basic ingredients of a totalitarian state as described by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Xi Jinping’s new totalitarianism and Mao’s old style of totalitarianism don’t differ by all that much.
   
   This year is the 40th anniversary of China’s “reform and opening” policy. While commonly seen as a key step in China’s modernization on the economic front, what reform and opening has really meant is that for 40 years political elites have colluded with businessmen in a Party-controlled, crony capitalist market economy. Under this kleptocratic system, the assets of regular citizens have never been afforded any institutionalized protection. On the ideological front, the Party has monopolized the media, created no-go zones in scholarship, instituted a brainwashing-style education system, established the Great Firewall, and persecuted intellectuals for their writing. On the legal front, the Party has always ridden roughshod over the law. Black jails, forced disappearances, torture, secret police, surveillance, judicial corruption, controlled elections, forced demolitions, and religious persecution have all been rampant. These abuses are a key element in the Party’s system of control. China’s Constitution on paper makes beautiful-sounding promises for human rights and basic freedoms, including a right to vote, equality, freedom of speech, belief, and association. But it’s clear that the Party’s rule of law is merely an empty promise. The Constitution didn’t guide the Party toward a rule-of-law democracy, but as Stein Ringen, a professor at Oxford, has documented, China is adopting a “sophisticated totalitarianism.” This totalitarianism is strict and refined without being brittle and dogmatic; it’s cruel and barbaric without being chaotic. China’s booming economy, social stability, and apparent popular support for Xi have fooled both the world and most Chinese citizens.
   
   Of course, the abolition of the presidential term limit was something Xi Jinping pushed hard for, but he seems to have had few other options. His first term was spent on anti-corruption campaigns, as well as military reform, purging the Internet, and cooking up a cult of personality, all in order to eliminate opposing voices and centralize power around himself. Eliminating Zhou Yongkang; violating the unwritten rules of immunity for Politburo Standing Committee members; getting rid of two former Central Military Commission vice chairmen; taking out potential successor Sun Zhengcai; abducting one of the major bankers for the Party elite, Xiao Jianhua; assuming control over the Deng Xiaoping-clan-linked Anbang conglomerate—all of this is sure to have sent shockwaves through the Communist Party. The “tigers” who were targets of his anti-corruption campaign of course would hate Xi and plot their revenge. It must have been clear to Xi that if he ever lost power, reprisal would be swift. A system of lifetime rule was the obvious solution.
   
   Peering beneath the surface, to deeper historical trends, it seems that for the Communist Party, as an autocratic system, personal dictatorship is a common means of dealing with crises. The Party faced, on the one hand, an accumulation of post-1989 new social energies—in the form of the Internet, the market, the spread of liberal ideas, the rights defense movement—and on the other hand, official corruption, conflicts between officials and citizens, an ecological crisis, a crisis in social morality, and many other crises. For the past several years, the economic dividends China has been able to harvest from favorable demographics, cheap labor, and globalization have been all but exhausted. Economists predict GDP growth will slow. The Communist Party already eliminated democratization—whether gradual or sudden—from its menu of options for responding to crises. And so all it is left with is strengthening centralized power and enhancing the forces of repression.
   
   From the perspective of the Communist Party itself, turning Xi Jinping—who comes from a “red” revolutionary pedigree and is dedicated to the preservation of the “red” dynasty—into a lifetime leader, may very well be a calculated response to the extremely complex circumstances the Party faces in the near future. In 2013, Xi, in alarm and anger, used the phrase “nobody was man enough to stand up and resist,” in reference to the failure of Soviet leaders to prevent the collapse of their communist regime. Five years later, he is now announcing to the world that he will be the one—the grand helmsman—to seize this key historical moment and save the Chinese Communist Party.
   
   The Party’s technical totalitarianism is already beginning to take shape: networked stability maintenance, big data, facial recognition, DNA collection, Party control of the market, strengthening of the secret police, stoking nationalist sentiment, expanded control of the media and Internet, mass arrests of rights activists, a personality cult around the leader. . . Most of these methods are a gradual expansion of what was already emerging under Hu Jintao: the expansion of secret police capabilities, for instance, was becoming an important component in the Party’s overall control of popular opinion and activism. Put another way, Fascism with Chinese Characteristics is now taking form. One Party, one Führer, one Xi Jinping ideology.
   
   Some have called the constitutional amendment to abolish presidential term limits “turning back history.” But a closer look shows that the Communist Party, since it took power in 1949, has always been heading in the opposite direction of the trend of history—Xi Jinping has simply slammed his foot on the gas pedal. Xi’s rein has really not had as far-reaching an influence on Chinese politics, economy, and society as many claim. The biggest impact of Xi Jinping has been primarily psychological: the Chinese public and intellectuals who still harbor illusions about the Communist Party, friends of the regime, and the “panda huggers” in the West—political leaders and experts alike—who have long carried water for the dictatorship under the false assumption that markets and “engagement” policy would inevitably lead to democratization, are now all at something of a loss.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场