新会员区

热血汉奸吴三桂
[主页]->[新会员区]->[热血汉奸吴三桂]->[哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难]
热血汉奸吴三桂
·热汉”分裂恰那研究中心“成立发刊词
·反共必须反华
·逐条对照邪教特征,中共才是的真正邪教!
·汉奸的好儿子--杨振宁教授
·新版“革命歌曲”!
·汉奸颂
·Fight fiendish CCP with "Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat"
·反驳核武粪青对台叫嚣?
·和网特先生或女士谈心之一:我对flg的“有病不用看”的思考!
·我的自白书兼答网特授予我“土鳖流氓”的光荣称号!
·到底是谁对不起那些热血青年?
·壮哉雄哉,唯大日本帝国不败!
·“念天地之悠悠,独怆然而泪下”
·娘,大哥他回来了
·中华民族是个糊涂的民族
·诗朗诵:劣等民族啊,你丫的名字叫支那
·反击博讯言信老粪青对微软先生的攻击
·浅论支那的武术
·再论支那的武术
·不要爱国
·美国和西方列强支持了中共在中国的法西斯独裁专制!
·东欧人民有的是勇气,支那人有的是奴性
·支共是最老练的政党
·俄罗斯居心叵测
·唯有大日本帝国方能救中国
·论支共党文化特点兼驳"汉奸现象"
·驱除汉狗,还我家帮
·应偷老板之命,草就"人民公敌"开刊词
·博讯代有粪青出,一代新粪换旧粪
·诗悼汉奸老前辈大阿伯:
· 博讯与粪青征战之三:驳编辑"一"先生
·几点说明
·博讯征战系列之一:驳粪青"小妖"
·我在博讯发贴的真实目的
·关于中共生化武器(或核武)毁灭美国的个人思考(附原文)
·智力低下的粪青怎和英明神武的汉奸斗
·粪青们想想..你们凭什么恨人日本人?
·"CHINA"你的学名叫"恰那"!
·随便非洲一个小食人部落比china长几千年
·支那这样的垃圾国家能"崛起"吗?
·所谓的世界反法西斯战争的胜利实际上是美国一家的胜利 !!
·分裂支那蓝图构想
·“神诌六号”上天,愚民洗脑高潮
·接受香mm的访问
·归来吧,我的汉奸兄弟姐妹们!
·年年六四,今有六四:纪念爱国愤青君
·由反驳“中国从古至今就是信仰上帝”说开去
·支那为何是世界上最劣等的民族
·对热汉某智障粪青“请问这里可有华夏子孙”答辩
·给美国政府呼吁严惩赵燕的签名信
·驳大陆人网友的万年渐进式民主论
·中日再来彻底一战
·天下唯有德者居之
·支日再战
·谁为支那的民主进程真正着急?
·英明神武的汉奸不会感动
·为张戎辨
·胡锦涛,陈良宇 VS 大屁股,小屁股!
·非暴力,不合作运动永远不可能栽支那成功
·邪恶的支那“大一统”思想
·驳斥博讯“天下无贼”的 谬论
·美国外交政策是短视的
·台湾问题
·给激进汉奸的一封信
·再给激进汉奸的一封信
·给李洪志老师的一封信
·谁在卖弄?
·无知,无耻,无畏的支那粪狗
·是否支持台湾独立是衡量是否是真民运的标准之一
·china=支那
·支英对照:日本人为啥么歧视中国人
·长寿的慰安妇
·美国非上帝
·应当对邪恶的支共高官执行”满门抄斩“
·孔子就一痞子落魄秀才
·香港为何不独立
·热汉是娘俺是孩
·必须暴力推翻支共
·国民党为何失败
·不自由毋宁死
·支共愚民洗脑确实成功:
·支那的经济
·给大汉民族的一封信
·支持台湾独立是每个台湾人的义务
·英汉对照:毛:不为人知的故事
·吴三桂翻译版:毛:不为人知的故事
·支共的内部争斗会危及其政权吗?
· 袁伟民在08奥运动员大会上的讲话(原创)
·去你妈的“爱国主义”(修订正式版)
·去你妈的“民族主义”
·去你妈的祖国
·去你妈的“中华民族”
·支那的制造业怎么了?(粪狗看看汉奸也还是爱国滴)
·诬我为日本人的必定是共特无疑
·东方红,太阳升,支那出了个刘翔。
·文革诗歌新编:放开我,妈妈!
·小姐颂
·咏支那博士
·简评李阳的“疯狂英语”
·害袁红冰老师者,其粉丝也
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难

[color=#0000FF]三桂评注: 目前为止本人看到的分析全球化最好的文章,不愧是哈佛教授,真知灼见,名不虚传。我n年前就反复强调所谓的“全球化”受惠的只有西方极少数财团和支那这样极度赤贫的奴隶制国家,哈佛教授的观点和我的观点不谋而合,他们认为西方的1%和亚洲的中产阶级是最大的受惠者,遭殃的却是广大的西方世界数量庞大的中产阶级,所以,我个人认为现在世界上所有的经济动荡和危机其万恶之源就是所谓的“全球化”,而地球人类如果足够聪明就应该把拥有十五亿奴工的支那排除出人类社会,任其自生自灭,恢复原有的生气勃勃的经济秩序,但是,西方从全球化中受益的1%的富豪们是绝对不会答应的,他们还想在他们原有的天文数字的财富上面继续锦上添花而完全不顾自由世界数以十亿计的普通百姓的生死存亡,他们已经彻底蜕变成了他们支那富豪伙伴们的同类,成了人类文明的公敌,西方这些1%的富豪们也就成了需要被文明世界人类打倒的对象。
   [/color]
   Why the Global 1% and the Asian Middle Class Have Gained the Most from Globalization
   Branko Milanovic
   MAY 13, 2016

    8.95
   
   [img]哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难
[/img]
   It is by now well-known that the period from the mid-1980s to today has been the period of the greatest reshuffle of personal incomes since the Industrial Revolution. It’s also the first time that global inequality has declined in the past two hundred years. The “winners” were the middle and upper classes of the relatively poor Asian countries and the global top 1%. The (relative) “losers” were the people in the lower and middle parts of rich countries’ income distributions, according to detailed household surveys data from more than 100 countries between 1988 and 2008, put together and analyzed by Christoph Lakner and myself, as well as my book Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, which includes updated information to 2011.
   
   [img]哈佛商业评论:全球化给人类带来的灾难
[/img]
   
   Find this and other HBR graphics in our VISUAL LIBRARY
   The chart above, the Global Incidence Curve, shows the world’s population along the horizontal axis, ranked from the poorest to the richest percentile; real income gains between 1988 and 2008 (adjusted for countries’ price levels) are shown on the vertical axis.
   
   The expansion of incomes around the median of the global income distribution was so overwhelming that it ensured global inequality’s decline — despite the real income growth of the top 1% and rising national inequalities in many countries. Real incomes more than doubled between 1988 and 2011 (though the extension to 2011 is not shown in this chart), a shift that involved large swaths of people (almost a third of the world population, most of them from Asia). And although our data for the past are quite tentative and in some cases not much better than guesses, it is still the first time since 1820 that global inequality is deemed to have gone down, from approximately 69 Gini points to around 64. (On the Gini scale, 100 would be complete inequality while 0 would be complete equality).
   
   The chart can be (and was) recast in many other ways, from using market exchange rates instead of exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power parity, to calculating it over the percentiles fixed at the positions they had at the initial period (1988), but whatever adjustment one does, the essential features –the supine S shape—with the peak around the global median and the trough around the 80th -90th global percentile, remain. It is precisely the growth in the middle, fueled by the resurgent Asia, and the quasi-stagnation of incomes around the 80-90th percentile of the global income distribution where Western middle classes are, that have attracted most attention. They lead to an obvious question: does the growth of the Asian (or more generally global) middle class occur on the back of income stagnation of the Western middle classes? Or at least, are the two somehow related? The follow-up question: how long can it last?
   
   In this context it is important to make two points. First, while we cannot ever fully convincingly establish causality between the two developments (because we are dealing with multifaceted processes that are way too complicated for that), the coincidence of the two developments will lead, and has led, many people to make that conclusion. But coincidence in time is not enough.
   
   Second, there is also a plausible narrative that the roles played by imports from Asia, as well as by offshoring and foreign outsourcing, link the two developments. One may then wonder if the policies that are credited for creating the new “middle class” in China, Vietnam, Thailand, and increasingly in India might not at the same time be “impoverishing” the middle classes in the rich world. If this is the case, we ought to get used to the apparently paradoxical situation that decreasing global inequality will coexist (or may be responsible) for rising national inequalities in the rich countries.
   
   If we then visualize the world over the next 30-50 years, in which other, even poorer countries, become the “new Chinas,” the stagnation of middle-class incomes in the rich countries may continue. Sure, there would be unavoidable, difficult twists and turns in that scenario. For example, in a couple of decades China could join the rich world fully, and its then-higher wages would no longer be a “threat” to rich countries’ workers. The deindustrialization of the West and the North might have by then progressed so far that the numbers of workers affected by the new competition from the poor parts of Asia and Africa may be much fewer and thus politically less salient.
   
   But the essential tradeoff may still remain: are increasing national inequalities the “price” we (the world) pay for decreasing global inequality and poverty? Is one “good” thing linked to another “bad” thing? This is a particularly pertinent question because peoples’ income comparators (the proverbial Joneses) are mostly people from their own country, rather than any random person in the world. Thus, the positive developments reflected in lower global inequality may not be something—however happy we may be that they are taking place—that matters much, politically speaking.
   
   In a recent, unpublished paper, John E. Roemer, a political scientist at Yale University, and I propose a simple model that attempts to take into account the fact that people care about both their absolute income level as well as their relative positions in national income distributions — not global ones. The results are revealing. When we assume that people care only about their incomes, as one does in usual calculations of global inequality or as one does in a cosmopolitan view of the world (where citizenship is ignored), global inequality indeed decreases as we have described above. But when we introduce some concern with national inequality, the decline becomes less significant. When the concern is equally shared between one’s absolute income and one’s relative national position, the decline in global inequality becomes an increase.
   
   The intuition behind this result is easy to grasp. In most countries, and especially in the big ones like China, India, the United States, and Russia, national inequalities have risen. So if people are more focused on national inequality, their concerns about what is happening at home will dominate the “objective” reduction of inequality across the globe.
   
   This may be politically a more meaningful way to look at global inequality, and it leads to a somber conclusion. Even if globalization were to be associated with an absolute real income improvement for all, or almost all, and reduced global inequality, if it is also associated with rising national inequalities, the unhappiness stemming from the latter may dominate. Globalization may be “felt” to produce a more unequal world, even if it objectively does not. Then the very facts that are globally hopeful and reassuring may have domestic consequences that are the very opposite.
   
   Branko Milanovic is Lead Economist in the World Bank research group and a visiting professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. His most recent book is Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization.
   This article is about ECONOMICS
   
    FOLLOW THIS TOPIC
   
   UP NEXT IN NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
   4 Big Economic Questions Now Facing the EU
   
   Fernando Fernandez
   
   UP NEXT IN CAREER PLANNING
   Change Your Career Without Having to Start All Over Again
   
   Dorie Clark
   
   UP NEXT IN DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS
   7 Things to Say When a Conversation Turns Negative
   
   Kathleen Kelley Reardon
   Comments
   
   
   POST
   4 COMMENTS
   GARETT ROBERTSON 20 days ago
   
   I am more of a hobbiest in economics that a serious player, but back in school i created a model for income inequality using continuous time markov chains. I think my model can explain why we global economies in upheaval, wealth being redistributed and GINI coefficients on the rise. It all basically boils down the propensity of economic agents to buy from other agents who are wealthier than they are. At the same time, wealthy agents tend to spend disproportionally on themselves compared to the poor.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场