滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[Is China Returning to the Madness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution?]
滕彪文集
·“你恐惧,中共的目的就达到了”
·SOME QUESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA TO ASK PRESIDENT XI
·Book Debate Raises Questions of Self-Censorship by Foreign Groups in C
·Leaked Email: ABA Cancels Book for Fear of ‘Upsetting the Chinese Gov
·Is the ABA Afraid of the Chinese Government?
·Middle way should not be the only voice: Chinese activist to Tibetans
·Middle way not the only way for Tibet, says Chinese rights lawyer
·被曝光的电邮:怕惹恼北京美国律师协会取消出版《黎明前的黑暗》
·美律协违约拒为滕彪出书 国会要求解释
·高智晟:ABA和滕彪哪個更應該強大
·Lawmakers Pounce After ABA Scraps Book by China Rights Lawyer
·American Self-Censorship Association/WSJ
·An interview with China’s foremost rights lawyer Dr Teng Biao
·纽约时报:中国律师新书命运引发在华NGO自我审查争议
·Is China Returning to the Madness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution?
·The Conundrum of Compromise/Robert Precht
·Congress Still Calling Out ABA Over Canceled Book Deal
·No country for academics: Chinese crackdown forces intellectuals abroa
·中共血債大於其他專制國家
·江绪林之死反映中国知识分子精神痛苦唯有自杀寻求解脱
·"THERE WILL ALWAYS BE SOME BRAVE ACTIVISTS WHO REFUSE TO KEEP QUIET"
·“你们全家都是共产党员!”
·滕彪和江天勇获第25届杰出民主人士奖
·访滕彪:中国司法何以如此“高效率”
·'China wacht een revolutie, ik hoop een vreedzame'
·Arrestatiegolf China toont angst van regime
·ENTRETIEN AVEC LE DéFENSEUR DES DROITS DE L'HOMME TENG BIAO
·Le Parti communiste chinois est confronté à une série de crises
·英媒:遭受打击 中国知识分子被迫出国
·709 Crackdown/ Front Line Defenders
·Cataloging the Torture of Lawyers in China
·南海仲裁的法理基础及其对中国的政治冲击
·the Comfort of Self-Censorship
·G20前夕美国家安全顾问会晤中国人权人士
·Chinese dissidents urge Obama to press Xi Jinping on human rights at G
·China blocks major civil society groups from monitoring G20 summit
·Open Letter to G20 Leaders attending the 2016 G20 Summit
·自我审查的自我安慰/滕彪
·细雨中的独白——写给十七年
·Rights lawyers publicly shamed by China's national bar association
·沉默的暴行
·中共“长臂”施压 维权律师滕彪妻子被迫离职
·除了革命,中国已经别无道路
·高瑜案件从一开始就是政治操控
·毛式文革与恐怖主义之异同——国内外专家学者访谈
·最高法维护狼牙山五壮士名誉 学者批司法为文宣服务
·滕彪和杨建利投书彭博社 批评美国大选不谈中国人权议题
·“未来关键运动的发起者可能是我们都不认识的人。”
·政治因素杀死了贾敬龙
·中国维权人士在达兰萨拉与藏人探讨“中共的命运”
·黑暗的2016:中国人权更加倒退的一年
·滕彪談廢死
·滕彪:酷刑逼供背後是国家支持的系统性暴力
·在黑暗中尋找光明
·专访滕彪、杨建利:美国新法案 不给人权侵害者发签证
·海内外民主人士促美制裁中国人权迫害者/RFA
·A Joint Statement Upon the Establishment of ‘China Human Rights Accou
·关于成立“中国人权问责中心”的声明
·Group to Probe China's Human Rights Violations Under U.S. Law
·The Long Reach of China to Silence Its Critics
·王臧:极权主义,不止是“地域性灾难”
·Trump has the power to fight China on human rights. Will he use it?
·纪录片《吊照门》
·「吊照门」事件 引发法界震盪
·脸书玩命想进中国/RFA
·中国反酷刑联盟成立公告
·德电台奖冉云飞滕彪获提名
·中国维权律师:风雨中的坚持
·Harassed Chinese rights lawyer still speaking out on Tibetans’ plight
·Beijing Suspends Licenses of 2 Lawyers Who Offered to Defend Tibetans
·VOA连线:中国反酷刑联盟成立,向酷刑说“不”
·Announcement of the Establishment of the China Anti-Torture Alliance
·Chinese Court Upends 13-Year-Old Rape, Murder, Robbery Convictions
·中共迫害律师的前前后后
·Scholars Return to YLS to Discuss Human Rights Advocacy in China
·Abducted Activists
·中国的民间反对运动与维权运动
·Conversation on China’s human rights: Professor provides first hand a
·Exiled Chinese lawyer says the country is moving toward a new totalita
·VOA时事大家谈:抓律师两高人大邀功,保政权司法第一要务
·滕彪讲述被绑架和单独关押的经历
·Chinese human rights lawyer stresses the duty to resist
·山东“刺死辱母者”案,为何引发民意汹涌?/VOA
·关于审查《城市流浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法》的建议书
·Street Vendor’s Execution Stokes Anger in China
·[video]Academic freedom in the East and Southeast
·海外华人学者成立民主转型研究所VOA
·美国律师协会为受难律师高智晟出书/VOA
·郭文貴爆料,為何中國當局反應強烈?
·杨银波:搞滕彪、李和平,我看不过去
·Chinese Rights Lawyer Strikes Back at ABA Over Scuttled Book/WSJ
·China puts leading human rights lawyer on trial for 'inciting subversi
·丧尽天良,709维权律师李和平被灌不明精神药物!
·709案的秘密審訊——酷刑之後,強迫喂藥
·王全璋:被“消失”的中国人权律师
·李和平等709律师被捕期间遭强迫灌药酷刑虐待
·李明哲案成陸對台籌碼
·川普政府吁中共尊重人权 学者促弃绥靖政策
·从709维权律师审判看盘古氏公司庭审秀 习近平是圣君还是反人类罪犯
· 纪念709,推动首届中国人权律师节
·709将成为〝中国人权律师节〞
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
Is China Returning to the Madness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution?

By Teng Biao
   
   https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/is-china-returning-to-the-madness-of-maos-cultural-revolution/
   
   The song most representative of China’s Cultural Revolution — the 10-year period between 1966 and 1976 of anarchy and anti-authority mania, where students tortured their teachers, employees denounced their bosses, and children murdered their parents — is “The East Is Red.” A simple yet catchy song about the brilliance of Chairman Mao Zedong, “The East Is Red” is an unofficial anthem of that decade; it articulated the brainwashed love people felt for the chairman. “The sun is rising. From China comes Mao Zedong,” the song lyrics go. “[Mao] strives for people’s happiness. Hurrah, he is the people’s great savior!”

   
   But over the last few months, a modern version of the song has been bouncing around the Internet. Titled “The East Is Red Again,” it proclaims with modified lyrics: “The sun again rises, and Xi Jinping succeeds Mao Zedong. He’s striving for the people’s rejuvenation. Hurrah, he is the people’s great lucky star!” And even though censors deleted mentions of the song on the Chinese Internet, Xi has not repudiated the comparison. Indeed, an early May concert at Beijing’s massive legislative building, the Great Hall of the People, featured a performance celebrating “red,” or Communist, songs, including “Socialism Is Good” and “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China.” Because of their popularity during the Cultural Revolution, these songs, and the act of playing them, now glorify that horrifically tumultuous era, which began 50 years ago on May 16.
   
   
   Sadly, the celebration of red songs is not the only similarity between Chinese politics today and in 1966. This March, during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, an important gathering of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, the delegation from Tibet wore badges showing Xi’s face. During the Cultural Revolution, people didn’t leave their houses without Mao badges. Like Mao, Xi has purged his political enemies through mass anti-corruption campaigns. Xi has strengthened the party’s control over the media and official ideology through the internal party communiqué Document No. 9, which warned about the dangers of press freedom. He also emphasized the need for patriotism in creative works during an influential October 2014 speech he delivered to important artists and propaganda officials.
   
   Xi has also resurrected the calcified, blindly pro-Communist discourse of the Mao era; he regularly exhorts cadres to participate in “mass line” campaigns, a hazily defined concept, and to “bare their blades in the ideological struggle.”Xi has also resurrected the calcified, blindly pro-Communist discourse of the Mao era; he regularly exhorts cadres to participate in “mass line” campaigns, a hazily defined concept, and to “bare their blades in the ideological struggle.” The anti-vice campaign — reminiscent of Mao’s mania for mass movements — that began in February 2014 in the southern city of Dongguan and spread throughout the country is yet another example of Xi’s Maoist madness.
   
   In some ways, it feels like Xi is trying to turn back time and relive the Cultural Revolution, where the party reigned supreme and invaded every aspect of Chinese life. Luckily, he can’t, for China and the world are different now. Even if Xi wanted to, he could never realize Mao’s Cultural Revolution-era disregard for all laws, human and holy, nor could he create a pervasive cult of personality. Mao was history’s harshest despot, its greatest persecutor of humanity. But he wouldn’t have been able to persecute hundreds of millions of Chinese people without the historical background, social structure, ideological framework, and international environment of mid-20th-century China.
   
   After Mao’s 1976 death, the party gradually settled on a system of collective dictatorship in which a small group of leaders rule for two five-year terms. Although the party operates above the law and seemingly without any effective restriction, there are internal disagreements and even power struggles among members at the highest levels. Moreover, there are divisions between the central leadership and local governments, which push back against orders from above. This so-called “local tyranny” poses a great obstacle to Xi’s campaign to deify himself.
   
   The Cultural Revolution saw the mobilization of hundreds of millions of people — into opposing, often warring factions — the complete destruction of China’s legal system, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. That is also entirely different from today. While there is a widening wealth gap between the rich and the poor, mass mobilization is a thing of the past. Although totalitarianism makes an occasional appearance, today’s China has a legal system that performs better than the chaos-riven courts of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the arrests of high-level officials and political dissidents are at least packaged in legal terms and implemented through ostensibly legal procedures. And the violence present in Chinese society today is on a much smaller scale than in the 1960s and 1970s.
   
   But if one defines the Cultural Revolution by its strict one-party rule, total control of the media, thought control, religious oppression, and suppression of dissent, then today differs only in degree. Xi has adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward political opposition and grassroots rights defense movements. Since Xi assumed power in late 2012, hundreds, if not thousands, of human rights defenders have been imprisoned. Civil society organizations like the pro-constitutionalism New Citizens’ Movement have been suppressed, and more than 300 human rights lawyers have been detained or intimidated. Many NGOs have been shut down; thousands of Christian crosses have been forcibly removed; Christian churches have been destroyed; and practitioners of small religious groups such as Falun Gong have been persecuted. Feminist activists, defenders of labor rights, Internet celebrities, and journalists who have dared to speak out have all been attacked.
   
   Meanwhile, in the name of “counterterrorism,” Xi has cracked down on the people of Xinjiang and Tibet, even imposing martial law in parts of those regions. In Hong Kong, he has delayed honoring Beijing’s promise of universal suffrage and suppressed the protest movement known as the Umbrella Revolution. Xi has implemented the imperial tactic of punishing an individual’s entire family for the acts of that individual, detaining Mainland China-based family members of overseas Chinese activists and using them as political hostages. And in complete disrespect for basic, internationally recognized human rights, Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai was kidnapped from Thailand and forcibly transported to China — all because he was connected to a book about Xi’s romantic history.
   
   But could the Cultural Revolution happen again in China? I don’t think so.But could the Cultural Revolution happen again in China? I don’t think so. The biggest difference between now and then is that Chinese people no longer bestow the party with the legitimacy it would need to implement such a campaign. Xi doesn’t control the Chinese people as tightly as Mao did — nor does Xi command the same loyalty, respect, and love. The 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, where members of the Chinese military slaughtered hundreds of unarmed student protestors, greatly reduced the party’s basis for rule. The authorities, knowing all too well the severity of their crimes, downplayed the matter and attempted to force the people to forget about it as well. Eventually, the party censored and forbade even the most oblique of references to the massacre. Over the last few decades, because of pervasive corruption, the forced demolition of many people’s homes, air pollution, forced abortions, and religious persecution, among other ills, dissatisfaction with the party has grown. The Internet and social media have helped to organize this dissatisfaction and resistance.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场