滕彪文集
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滕彪文集
·激 活 宪 法
·孙志刚事件:知识、媒介与权力
·司法的归司法,舆论的归舆论?—从张金柱案到黄静案
·谁能阻止一个人心底的眼泪—日记16则,纪念父亲
·生活是维权运动的源头活水
·虚构的故事
·体制的边界
临沂计划生育调查手记
·蒙河边的抗争—临沂计划生育调查手记之一
·“我家亲戚被抓了22口”—临沂计划生育调查手记之二
·她的眼里没有泪水—临沂计划生育调查手记之三
·到办公室上课去!—临沂计划生育调查手记之四
·不扎也得扎!—临沂计划生育调查手记之五
·学习班—临沂计划生育调查手记之六
·向人性宣战—临沂计划生育调查手记之七
·“盯关跟主义”—临沂计划生育调查手记之八
·人性不曾屈服—临沂计划生育调查手记之九
·野蛮是如何炼成的?—临沂计划生育调查手记之十
·后记:
·有谁战胜过真相
·法治中国需要中国法律人的良知及责任—致世界法律大会中国代表的公开信
·从上书到公开信
·是谁在“严重威胁社会秩序”?—关于游行示威权利的行政复议申请书
·致陈光诚的一封信
·用微笑来面对那些制造恐惧的人——和高智晟在一起的一个下午
·2+2=4的自由
·推倒「新闻柏林围墙」——透视中国新闻自由的前景
·恢复收容遣送制度等于开历史倒车
·陈光诚案凸显中国法治的困局
·暗夜里的光明之舞
·中国维权运动往何处去?
·陈光诚是如何被定罪的?(补充版)
·Crusader in a legal wilderness
·China’s blind Justice
·China's Political Courts
·以公民的姿态挺身而出/闵家桥
·“最可贵的是她有健康的公民意识”——关于公民王淑荣的对话
·“阳光宪政”的护卫者/民主与法制杂志
·要让好人走到一起,才能合力纠错——奥美定事件亲历者访谈录/南方周末
·李卫平: 被迫走出书斋的维权者——著名维权律师滕彪访谈录
·太阳城:写在第三期“名家说法”被命令取消之后
·滕彪印象/法制日报
·Rule of Law requires our consciousness and responsibility
·临沂野蛮计生与陈光诚事件维权大事记(2006-11-7)
·耻为盛世添顺骨
·中国时报专访:盼与政府互动 和平维权
·滕彪博士:精神家园的守望者/刘爽
·司法改良和公民维权——学而思沙龙的网谈
·学术、政治与生活——2006年12月17日做客沧海论坛在线交流记录
·黎明前的见证
·看看我们的朋友——致受难中的高智晟和他的妻子和孩子
·临沂警匪暴行录
·临沂野蛮计生事件及陈光诚案维权大事记(五——七)
·中国当代宪政主义者的困境和选择/林泽波
·通过汉语改变中国
·茶人滕彪/萧瀚
·崔英杰案:“慎杀时代”的第一个考验
·死刑、司法与中国人权
·废除死刑的中国语境——在第三届世界反死刑大会上的发言
·司法独立,和谐中国——2007年“两会”之际的公民呼吁/许志永 滕彪
·彻底改革司法才能避免滥用死刑
·崔英杰案,在多重反思中寻找契机
·从“两会”看赎回选票运动
·关于尽快将青岛市四方区政府违法拆迁行为纳入法制轨道的法律意见书
·青岛野蛮拆迁:袁薪玉被控放火和妨害公务案一审的当庭辩护意见
·维权书简·戴脚镣的舞者
·被遗忘的谎言——就《成都晚报》事件致中宣部长和教育部长的一封信
·滕彪:可怕的“冤案递增律”
·不是我不明白
·张敏:滕彪律师访美谈中国司法现状与维权
·萧洵:纸包子案记者被判刑引发强烈质疑
·自由亚洲电台:拾荒者遇上联防离奇死亡 孙志刚式悲剧首都重现?
·何亚福 王鑫海 杨支柱等:放开二胎倡议书
·临沂野蛮计生事件及陈光诚案维权大事记(八--九)
·一个案件的真相与两个案件的正义(附:“聂树斌案”到了最危急时刻!)
·滕彪、胡佳:奥运前的中国真相
·郑筱萸案扇了死刑复核程序一记耳光/滕彪 李方平
·“杀害自己孩子的民族没有未来!”
·关于李和平律师被绑架殴打致国务院、最高人民检察院、公安部、国家安全部的公开信(签名中)
·NO FIGHTS,NO RIGHTS——接受博闻社采访谈中国人权现状
·挽包遵信先生
·香港电台铿锵集:扣着脚镣跳舞的中国律师
·那些陌生的人们在我们心底哭泣——推荐一个短片
·关于邮箱被盗用的声明
·《律师法》37条:为律师准备的新陷阱
·保护维权律师,实现法治——采访法学博士滕彪律师/张程
·Six Attorneys Openly Defend Falun Gong in Chinese Court
·李和平 滕彪等:为法轮功学员辩护-宪法至上 信仰自由
·面对暴力的思考与记忆——致李和平
·专访滕彪律师:《律师法》2007修订与维权/RFA张敏
·The Real China before the Olympics/Teng Biao,Hu jia
·我们不能坐等美好的社会到来
·律师:维权人士胡佳将受到起诉
·胡佳被捕 顯示中國要在奧運之前大清場
·人权的价值与正义的利益
·抓捕胡佳意味着什么?
·关于《奥运前的中国真相》一文的说明——声援胡佳之一
·邮箱作废声明
·关于审查和改变《互联网视听节目服务管理规定》部分不适当条款的建议
·胡佳的大爱与大勇
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Is China Returning to the Madness of Mao’s Cultural Revolution?

By Teng Biao
   
   https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/16/is-china-returning-to-the-madness-of-maos-cultural-revolution/
   
   The song most representative of China’s Cultural Revolution — the 10-year period between 1966 and 1976 of anarchy and anti-authority mania, where students tortured their teachers, employees denounced their bosses, and children murdered their parents — is “The East Is Red.” A simple yet catchy song about the brilliance of Chairman Mao Zedong, “The East Is Red” is an unofficial anthem of that decade; it articulated the brainwashed love people felt for the chairman. “The sun is rising. From China comes Mao Zedong,” the song lyrics go. “[Mao] strives for people’s happiness. Hurrah, he is the people’s great savior!”

   
   But over the last few months, a modern version of the song has been bouncing around the Internet. Titled “The East Is Red Again,” it proclaims with modified lyrics: “The sun again rises, and Xi Jinping succeeds Mao Zedong. He’s striving for the people’s rejuvenation. Hurrah, he is the people’s great lucky star!” And even though censors deleted mentions of the song on the Chinese Internet, Xi has not repudiated the comparison. Indeed, an early May concert at Beijing’s massive legislative building, the Great Hall of the People, featured a performance celebrating “red,” or Communist, songs, including “Socialism Is Good” and “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China.” Because of their popularity during the Cultural Revolution, these songs, and the act of playing them, now glorify that horrifically tumultuous era, which began 50 years ago on May 16.
   
   
   Sadly, the celebration of red songs is not the only similarity between Chinese politics today and in 1966. This March, during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, an important gathering of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, the delegation from Tibet wore badges showing Xi’s face. During the Cultural Revolution, people didn’t leave their houses without Mao badges. Like Mao, Xi has purged his political enemies through mass anti-corruption campaigns. Xi has strengthened the party’s control over the media and official ideology through the internal party communiqué Document No. 9, which warned about the dangers of press freedom. He also emphasized the need for patriotism in creative works during an influential October 2014 speech he delivered to important artists and propaganda officials.
   
   Xi has also resurrected the calcified, blindly pro-Communist discourse of the Mao era; he regularly exhorts cadres to participate in “mass line” campaigns, a hazily defined concept, and to “bare their blades in the ideological struggle.”Xi has also resurrected the calcified, blindly pro-Communist discourse of the Mao era; he regularly exhorts cadres to participate in “mass line” campaigns, a hazily defined concept, and to “bare their blades in the ideological struggle.” The anti-vice campaign — reminiscent of Mao’s mania for mass movements — that began in February 2014 in the southern city of Dongguan and spread throughout the country is yet another example of Xi’s Maoist madness.
   
   In some ways, it feels like Xi is trying to turn back time and relive the Cultural Revolution, where the party reigned supreme and invaded every aspect of Chinese life. Luckily, he can’t, for China and the world are different now. Even if Xi wanted to, he could never realize Mao’s Cultural Revolution-era disregard for all laws, human and holy, nor could he create a pervasive cult of personality. Mao was history’s harshest despot, its greatest persecutor of humanity. But he wouldn’t have been able to persecute hundreds of millions of Chinese people without the historical background, social structure, ideological framework, and international environment of mid-20th-century China.
   
   After Mao’s 1976 death, the party gradually settled on a system of collective dictatorship in which a small group of leaders rule for two five-year terms. Although the party operates above the law and seemingly without any effective restriction, there are internal disagreements and even power struggles among members at the highest levels. Moreover, there are divisions between the central leadership and local governments, which push back against orders from above. This so-called “local tyranny” poses a great obstacle to Xi’s campaign to deify himself.
   
   The Cultural Revolution saw the mobilization of hundreds of millions of people — into opposing, often warring factions — the complete destruction of China’s legal system, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. That is also entirely different from today. While there is a widening wealth gap between the rich and the poor, mass mobilization is a thing of the past. Although totalitarianism makes an occasional appearance, today’s China has a legal system that performs better than the chaos-riven courts of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the arrests of high-level officials and political dissidents are at least packaged in legal terms and implemented through ostensibly legal procedures. And the violence present in Chinese society today is on a much smaller scale than in the 1960s and 1970s.
   
   But if one defines the Cultural Revolution by its strict one-party rule, total control of the media, thought control, religious oppression, and suppression of dissent, then today differs only in degree. Xi has adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward political opposition and grassroots rights defense movements. Since Xi assumed power in late 2012, hundreds, if not thousands, of human rights defenders have been imprisoned. Civil society organizations like the pro-constitutionalism New Citizens’ Movement have been suppressed, and more than 300 human rights lawyers have been detained or intimidated. Many NGOs have been shut down; thousands of Christian crosses have been forcibly removed; Christian churches have been destroyed; and practitioners of small religious groups such as Falun Gong have been persecuted. Feminist activists, defenders of labor rights, Internet celebrities, and journalists who have dared to speak out have all been attacked.
   
   Meanwhile, in the name of “counterterrorism,” Xi has cracked down on the people of Xinjiang and Tibet, even imposing martial law in parts of those regions. In Hong Kong, he has delayed honoring Beijing’s promise of universal suffrage and suppressed the protest movement known as the Umbrella Revolution. Xi has implemented the imperial tactic of punishing an individual’s entire family for the acts of that individual, detaining Mainland China-based family members of overseas Chinese activists and using them as political hostages. And in complete disrespect for basic, internationally recognized human rights, Swedish bookseller Gui Minhai was kidnapped from Thailand and forcibly transported to China — all because he was connected to a book about Xi’s romantic history.
   
   But could the Cultural Revolution happen again in China? I don’t think so.But could the Cultural Revolution happen again in China? I don’t think so. The biggest difference between now and then is that Chinese people no longer bestow the party with the legitimacy it would need to implement such a campaign. Xi doesn’t control the Chinese people as tightly as Mao did — nor does Xi command the same loyalty, respect, and love. The 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, where members of the Chinese military slaughtered hundreds of unarmed student protestors, greatly reduced the party’s basis for rule. The authorities, knowing all too well the severity of their crimes, downplayed the matter and attempted to force the people to forget about it as well. Eventually, the party censored and forbade even the most oblique of references to the massacre. Over the last few decades, because of pervasive corruption, the forced demolition of many people’s homes, air pollution, forced abortions, and religious persecution, among other ills, dissatisfaction with the party has grown. The Internet and social media have helped to organize this dissatisfaction and resistance.

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