滕彪文集
[主页]->[独立中文笔会]->[滕彪文集]->[From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao ]
滕彪文集
·《零八宪章》与政治正当性问题
·我来推推推(之二)
·我来推推推(之三)
·國慶有感
·我来推推推(之四)
·国庆的故事(系列之一)
·国庆的故事(系列之二)
·
·我来推推推(之五)
·我来推推推(之六)
·净空(小说)
·作为反抗的记忆——《不虚此行——北京劳教调遣处纪实》序
·twitter直播-承德冤案申诉行动
·我来推推推(之七)
·关于我的证言的证言
·我来推推推(之八)
·不只是问问而已
·甘锦华再判死刑 紧急公开信呼吁慎重
·就甘锦华案致最高人民法院死刑复核法官的紧急公开信
·我来推推推(之九)
·DON’T BE EVIL
·我来推推推(之十)
·景德镇监狱三名死刑犯绝食吁国际关注
·江西乐平死刑冤案-向最高人民检察院的申诉材料
·我来推推推(之十一)
·法律人的尊严在于独立
·我来推推推(之十二)
·听从正义和良知的呼唤——在北京市司法局关于吊销唐吉田、刘巍律师证的听证会上的代理意见
·一个思想实验:关于中国政治
·公民维权与社会转型(上)——在北京传知行社会经济研究所的演讲
·公民维权与社会转型——在北京传知行社会经济研究所的演讲(下)
·福州“7•4”奇遇记
·夏俊峰案二审辩护词(新版)
·摄录机打破官方垄断
·敦请最高人民检察院立即对重庆打黑运动中的刑讯逼供问题依法调查的公开信
·为政治文明及格线而奋斗——滕彪律师的维权之路
·“打死挖个坑埋了!”
·"A Hole to Bury You"
·谁来承担抵制恶法的责任——曹顺利被劳动教养案代理词
·国家尊重和保障人权从严禁酷刑开始
·分裂的真相——关于钱云会案的对话
·无国界记者:对刘晓波诽谤者的回应
·有些人在法律面前更平等(英文)
·法律人与法治国家——在《改革内参》座谈会上的演讲
·貪官、死刑與民意
·茉莉:友爱的滕彪和他的诗情
·萧瀚:致滕彪兄
·万延海:想起滕彪律师
·滕彪:被迫走上它途的文學小子/威廉姆斯
·中国两位律师获民主奖/美国之音
·独立知识分子——写给我的兄弟/许志永
·滕彪的叫真/林青
·2011年十大法治事件(公盟版)
·Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Under Assault
·《乱诗》/殷龙龙
·吴英的生命和你我有关
·和讯微访谈•滕彪谈吴英案
·吴英、司法与死刑
·努力走向公民社会(视频访谈)
·【蔡卓华案】胡锦云被诉窝藏赃物罪的二审辩护词
·23岁青年被非法拘禁致死 亲属六年申请赔偿无果
·5月2日与陈光诚的谈话记录
·华邮评论:支持中国说真话者的理由
·中国律师的阴与阳/金融时报
·陈光诚应该留还是走?/刘卫晟
·含泪劝猫莫吃鼠
·AB的故事
·陈克贵家属关于拒绝接受两名指定律师的声明
·这个时代最优异的死刑辩词/茉莉
·自救的力量
·不只是问问而已
·The use of Citizens Documentary in Chinese Civil Rights Movements
·行政强制法起草至今23年未通过
·Rights Defence Movement Online and Offline
·遭遇中国司法
·一个单纯的反对者/阳光时务周刊
·“颠覆国家政权罪”的政治意涵/滕彪
·财产公开,与虎谋皮
·Changing China through Mandarin
·通过法律的抢劫——答《公民论坛》问
·Teng Biao: Defense in the Second Trial of Xia Junfeng Case
·血拆危局/滕彪
·“中国专制体制依赖死刑的象征性”
·To Remember Is to Resist/Teng Biao
·Striking a blow for freedom
·滕彪:维权、微博与围观:维权运动的线上与线下(上)
·滕彪:维权、微博与围观:维权运动的线上与线下(下)
·达赖喇嘛与中国国内人士视频会面问答全文
·台灣法庭初體驗-專訪滕彪
·滕彪:中国政治需要死刑作伴
·一个反动分子的自白
·强烈要求释放丁红芬等公民、立即取缔黑监狱的呼吁书
·The Confessions of a Reactionary
·浦志强 滕彪: 王天成诉周叶中案代理词
·选择维权是一种必然/德国之声
·A courageous Chinese lawyer urges his country to follow its own laws
·警方建议起诉许志永,意见书似“公民范本”
·对《集会游行示威法》提起违宪审查的公开建议书
·对《集会游行示威法》提起违宪审查的公开建议书
·滕彪访谈录:在“反动”的道路上越走越远
·因家暴杀夫被核准死刑 学界联名呼吁“刀下留人”
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao


   http://www.hrichina.org/en/china-rights-forum/stability-maintenance-and-control-wiping-out
   
   July 25, 2014
   

   
   [Translation by Human Rights in China]
   
   The ongoing nationwide crackdown of activists in China has brought bad news every day. Within three weeks, more than 60 intellectuals and rights defenders have been detained. Among them are rights protection lawyers Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), Liu Shihui (刘士辉), and Tang Jinling (唐荆陵); pro-democracy rights defenders Hu Shigen (胡石根), Yuan Xinting (袁新亭), Wang Qingying (王清营), Master Shengguan (圣观法师), Xiucai Jianghu (秀才江湖), Xie Wenfei (谢文飞), Yang Chong (杨崇), and Jia Lingmin (贾灵敏); journalists Gao Yu(高瑜), Wu Wei (吴薇), Xiang Nanfu (向南夫), and辛建 (Xin Jian); scholars Xu Youyu (徐友渔) and Hao Jian (郝建); artist Xu Guang (徐光); as well as documentary producer Shen Yongping (沉勇平). There are also quite a few others who have gone missing.
   
   Some interpret this crackdown as an escalation of the authorities’ weiwen (stability maintenance) mechanism in anticipation of this year’s June Fourth anniversary. Some see it as a sign of the out-of-control misuse of police force and power by the political and legal system. Some others attribute it to the spillover of factional conflicts in the central government. I venture to disagree with all these views. The starting point of this wave of large-scale suppression of civil society is not the detention of the “Five Gentleman of May 3”[1] this year, but can be traced back to the detention of the “Four Gentlemen of Xidan” last year. On March 31, 2013, [the “Four Gentlemen”] Yuan Dong (袁冬), Zhang Baocheng (张宝成), and two others [Li Wei (李蔚) and Hou Xin (侯欣)] were taken away by police on the spot when they were giving a speech in the Xidan commercial area of Beijing calling for public disclosure of officials’ assets. This incident raised the curtain of the authorities’ crackdown on the New Citizens Movement and China’s civil society at large. Over the course of one year, more than 200 rights defenders around the country were taken into custody, including Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Wang Gongquan (王功权), Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄), Li Huaping (李化平), Chen Baocheng (陈宝成), Zhang Lin (张林), Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜), Liu Ping (刘萍), Yuan Fengchu (袁奉初), Ilham Tohti (伊力哈木), and many more. In particular, renowned rights defender Cao Shunli (曹顺利) was tormented to death by the authorities. The crackdown does not only target rights defenders. The suppression aimed at dissidents, underground churches, Falun Gong practitioners, petitioners, Internet activists, and liberal scholars has clearly intensified. And the control of information dissemination and ideology has clearly tightened.
   
   While this crackdown wave has not taken the form of that in the period of the Jasmine rallies of 2011—including large-scale abduction, secret detention, and torture (escalated emergency stability maintenance measures)—it has far exceeded the latter in terms of duration, area of impact, number of detainees, and severity of punishment.
   
   Ever since he took office, President Xi Jinping has made evident attempts at changing the approach to handling civil society. One can locate the starting point of this change in the 2013 “Four Gentlemen of Xidan” incident. In the course of the crackdown, in collecting information, observing civil society’s reactions, exploring and experimenting with new tactics, the authorities have continued to strengthen this new approach. One can call this change a transition “from the stability maintenance-and-control model to the rooting-out model,” or “from the control model to the wiping out model.” The new approach is by no means contingent in nature or incident-specific, but, rather, it is characterized by planning and procedure. Instead of specified individuals, it targets the entire civil society.
   
   Previously, the targets were those who crossed the red line, stood out, took to the street, or engaged in organized actions. Now, the trend seems to be netting everyone in one fell swoop. Everyone who is active, influential, and able to take actions may be on the target list. Being detained during a specific incident doesn’t mean that the incident is the reason for the detention. Rather, the detention waits for an excuse, an opportunity, to be carried out—as if it is settling old scores, once and for all. While the previous approach aimed to punish individual “line-crossers” and to maintain the superiority of the stability maintenance strength, the current practice is to eliminate all nodes of connectivity in civil society, nip all emerging civil society leaders in the bud, and completely destroy the capability of civil resistance. Since last spring, one can see from the large scale of detentions and the severity of the repression the authorities’ determination to eliminate civil society’s strength of resistance. Or at least check the momentum of Chinese civil society’s steady growth and quiet expansion over the past decade.
   
   Xi Jinping is not China’s Gorbachev, but the ideological heir of Maoism. Democracy and Constitutionalism have no place in his value system, as one can deduce from his vantage point as a princeling, his educational background, his immersion in the crucible of Communist Party culture throughout his career, and the speeches he has given before and during his presidency. He said that “China does not export revolution” and that “people cannot deny what was done before the reform and opening-up based on what happened after it, and vice versa.” His administration exerted greater ideological control by circulating the “Seven Unmentionables” and Document No. 9.[2] All of this, along with Xi’s “August 19” speech,[3] visit to Hunan—Mao Zedong’s home province—and assuming the chairmanship of the National Security Commission—lays bare the new CPC Secretary General’s position and ambition. It’s thus time for public intellectuals to abandon any false hope for the regime’s change of heart. The Economist magazine was shrewd to call it like it is: they attired President Xi in a dragon robe on its cover. Yet even the clout of an emperor is nothing compared to the Maoist monopoly of power. Maoism, one-party rule, and the eternal dominance of the Red Communist Party over China are the universal truths for Xi. In fact, Xi’s belief is no different than that of his predecessor Hu Jintao, but Xi has greater motivation, prowess, confidence, and less restraint and hesitance in his action. This is already evident in the attack he already launched against the “Black Five”—right defense lawyers, underground churches, dissidents, leaders of online activism, and vulnerable groups. More important, in the eyes of the government and Party leadership, the failure to carry out “extraordinary deterrence” against and deliver destructive blows to civil society and opposition forces as represented by the “Black Five,” would present a “clear and present” threat to the so-called “people’s interests and social stability,” which in essence means the legitimacy and interests of the Party.
   
   Yet China’s civil society already possesses the foundation for self-regeneration and is capable of steady and healthy development. This, on the one hand, is the cumulative result of the Internet, marketization, globalization, legalization, growing citizenship consciousness, and social movements. On the other hand, it is a testimony to the current regime’s innate illegitimacy, the current system’s constant infringement on citizen’s rights and continuous conflicts and clashes with the people, the waning appeal of the current ideology, the continuous environmental degradation, and the continuous crises generated by the current development model. This is the larger context that has propelled China’s civil society forces and forces promoting freedom and democracy on an upward spiral, in a trend so powerful that it seems unstoppable despite the will of the Chinese leaders. The process will surely be a tortuous one, with setbacks, adversities, and sacrifices. More people will have to pay a heart-wrenching price, and bad news will reach us time and again. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind the larger sociopolitical context that I just described because the same crises that have prompted the Chinese government to adopt a new coping mechanism are also the very reason why this new approach will never succeed.

[下一页]
blog comments powered by Disqus
blog comments powered by Disqus

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场