滕彪文集
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滕彪文集
·挽包遵信先生
·香港电台铿锵集:扣着脚镣跳舞的中国律师
·那些陌生的人们在我们心底哭泣——推荐一个短片
·关于邮箱被盗用的声明
·《律师法》37条:为律师准备的新陷阱
·保护维权律师,实现法治——采访法学博士滕彪律师/张程
·Six Attorneys Openly Defend Falun Gong in Chinese Court
·李和平 滕彪等:为法轮功学员辩护-宪法至上 信仰自由
·面对暴力的思考与记忆——致李和平
·专访滕彪律师:《律师法》2007修订与维权/RFA张敏
·The Real China before the Olympics/Teng Biao,Hu jia
·我们不能坐等美好的社会到来
·律师:维权人士胡佳将受到起诉
·胡佳被捕 顯示中國要在奧運之前大清場
·人权的价值与正义的利益
·抓捕胡佳意味着什么?
·关于《奥运前的中国真相》一文的说明——声援胡佳之一
·邮箱作废声明
·关于审查和改变《互联网视听节目服务管理规定》部分不适当条款的建议
·胡佳的大爱与大勇
·后极权时代的公民美德与公民责任
·狱中致爱人
·奥运和乞丐不能并存?
·滕彪李苏滨关于青岛于建利涉嫌诽谤罪案的辩护意见
·纽约时报社评:中国的爱国小将们
·回网友四书
·我们都来关注滕彪博士/王天成
·暴力带不来和平,恐怖建不成和谐——就滕彪、李和平事件感言/王德邦
·让滕彪回家、追究国保撞车肇事的法律责任、还被监控公民自由/维权网
·刘晓波:黑暗权力的颠狂——有感于滕彪被绑架
·Article 37 of the PRC Law on Lawyers: A New Trap Set for Lawyers
·Chinese lawyer missing after criticising human rights record
·Chinese Lawyer Says He Was Detained and Warned on Activism
·For Chinese activists, stakes are raised ahead of the Olympics
·To my wife, from jail/Teng Biao
·Beijing Suspends Licenses of 2 Lawyers Who Offered to Defend Tibetans in Court
·National Endowment for Democracy 2008 Democracy Awards
·获奖感言
·司法与民意——镜城突围
·Rewards and risks of a career in the legal system
·太离谱的现实感
·35个网评员对“这鸡蛋真难吃”的不同回答(转载加编辑加原创)
·Dissonance Strikes A Chord
·顺应历史潮流 实现律协直选——致全体北京律师、市司法局、市律协的呼吁
·但愿程序正义从杨佳案开始/滕彪 许志永
·维权的计算及其他
·我们对北京律协“严正声明”的回应
·网络言论自由讨论会会议纪要(上)
·网络言论自由讨论会会议纪要(下)
·Well-Known Human Rights Advocate Teng Biao Is Not Afraid
·法眼冷对三鹿门
·北京律师为自己维权风暴/亚洲周刊
·胡佳若获诺贝尔奖将推动中国人权/voa
·奥运后的中国人权
·Chinese Activist Wins Rights Prize
·我无法放弃——记一次“绑架”
·认真对待出国权
·毒奶粉:谁的危机?
·不要制造聂树斌——甘锦华抢劫案的当庭辩护词
·“独立知识分子”滕彪/刘溜
·经济观察报专访/滕彪:让我们不再恐惧
·人权:从理念到制度——纪念《世界人权宣言》60周年
·公民月刊:每一个人都可能是历史的转折点
·抵制央视、拒绝洗脑
·公民在行动
·Charter of Democracy
·阳光茅老
·中国“黑监狱”情况让人担忧/路透社
·《关于取缔黑监狱的建议》
·用法律武器保护家园——青岛市河西村民拆迁诉讼代理词
·关于改革看守所体制及审前羁押制度的公民建议书
·仅仅因为他们说了真话
·再审甘锦华 生死仍成谜
·邓玉娇是不是“女杨佳”?
·星星——为六四而作
·I Cannot Give Up: Record of a "Kidnapping"
·Political Legitimacy and Charter 08
·六四短信
·倡议“5•10”作为“公民正当防卫日”
·谁是敌人——回"新浪网友"
·为逯军喝彩
·赠晓波
·正义的运动场——邓玉娇案二人谈
·这六年,公盟做了什么?
·公盟不死
·我们不怕/Elena Milashina
·The Law On Trial In China
·自由有多重要,翻墙就有多重要
·你也会被警察带走吗
·Lawyer’s Detention Shakes China’s Rights Movement
·我来推推推
·许志永年表
·庄璐小妹妹快回家吧
·开江县法院随意剥夺公民的辩护权
·Summary Biography of Xu Zhiyong
·三著名行政法学家关于“公盟取缔事件”法律意见书
·公益诉讼“抑郁症”/《中国新闻周刊》
·在中石化上访
·《零八宪章》与政治正当性问题
·我来推推推(之二)
·我来推推推(之三)
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From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao


   http://www.hrichina.org/en/china-rights-forum/stability-maintenance-and-control-wiping-out
   
   July 25, 2014
   

   
   [Translation by Human Rights in China]
   
   The ongoing nationwide crackdown of activists in China has brought bad news every day. Within three weeks, more than 60 intellectuals and rights defenders have been detained. Among them are rights protection lawyers Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), Liu Shihui (刘士辉), and Tang Jinling (唐荆陵); pro-democracy rights defenders Hu Shigen (胡石根), Yuan Xinting (袁新亭), Wang Qingying (王清营), Master Shengguan (圣观法师), Xiucai Jianghu (秀才江湖), Xie Wenfei (谢文飞), Yang Chong (杨崇), and Jia Lingmin (贾灵敏); journalists Gao Yu(高瑜), Wu Wei (吴薇), Xiang Nanfu (向南夫), and辛建 (Xin Jian); scholars Xu Youyu (徐友渔) and Hao Jian (郝建); artist Xu Guang (徐光); as well as documentary producer Shen Yongping (沉勇平). There are also quite a few others who have gone missing.
   
   Some interpret this crackdown as an escalation of the authorities’ weiwen (stability maintenance) mechanism in anticipation of this year’s June Fourth anniversary. Some see it as a sign of the out-of-control misuse of police force and power by the political and legal system. Some others attribute it to the spillover of factional conflicts in the central government. I venture to disagree with all these views. The starting point of this wave of large-scale suppression of civil society is not the detention of the “Five Gentleman of May 3”[1] this year, but can be traced back to the detention of the “Four Gentlemen of Xidan” last year. On March 31, 2013, [the “Four Gentlemen”] Yuan Dong (袁冬), Zhang Baocheng (张宝成), and two others [Li Wei (李蔚) and Hou Xin (侯欣)] were taken away by police on the spot when they were giving a speech in the Xidan commercial area of Beijing calling for public disclosure of officials’ assets. This incident raised the curtain of the authorities’ crackdown on the New Citizens Movement and China’s civil society at large. Over the course of one year, more than 200 rights defenders around the country were taken into custody, including Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Wang Gongquan (王功权), Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄), Li Huaping (李化平), Chen Baocheng (陈宝成), Zhang Lin (张林), Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜), Liu Ping (刘萍), Yuan Fengchu (袁奉初), Ilham Tohti (伊力哈木), and many more. In particular, renowned rights defender Cao Shunli (曹顺利) was tormented to death by the authorities. The crackdown does not only target rights defenders. The suppression aimed at dissidents, underground churches, Falun Gong practitioners, petitioners, Internet activists, and liberal scholars has clearly intensified. And the control of information dissemination and ideology has clearly tightened.
   
   While this crackdown wave has not taken the form of that in the period of the Jasmine rallies of 2011—including large-scale abduction, secret detention, and torture (escalated emergency stability maintenance measures)—it has far exceeded the latter in terms of duration, area of impact, number of detainees, and severity of punishment.
   
   Ever since he took office, President Xi Jinping has made evident attempts at changing the approach to handling civil society. One can locate the starting point of this change in the 2013 “Four Gentlemen of Xidan” incident. In the course of the crackdown, in collecting information, observing civil society’s reactions, exploring and experimenting with new tactics, the authorities have continued to strengthen this new approach. One can call this change a transition “from the stability maintenance-and-control model to the rooting-out model,” or “from the control model to the wiping out model.” The new approach is by no means contingent in nature or incident-specific, but, rather, it is characterized by planning and procedure. Instead of specified individuals, it targets the entire civil society.
   
   Previously, the targets were those who crossed the red line, stood out, took to the street, or engaged in organized actions. Now, the trend seems to be netting everyone in one fell swoop. Everyone who is active, influential, and able to take actions may be on the target list. Being detained during a specific incident doesn’t mean that the incident is the reason for the detention. Rather, the detention waits for an excuse, an opportunity, to be carried out—as if it is settling old scores, once and for all. While the previous approach aimed to punish individual “line-crossers” and to maintain the superiority of the stability maintenance strength, the current practice is to eliminate all nodes of connectivity in civil society, nip all emerging civil society leaders in the bud, and completely destroy the capability of civil resistance. Since last spring, one can see from the large scale of detentions and the severity of the repression the authorities’ determination to eliminate civil society’s strength of resistance. Or at least check the momentum of Chinese civil society’s steady growth and quiet expansion over the past decade.
   
   Xi Jinping is not China’s Gorbachev, but the ideological heir of Maoism. Democracy and Constitutionalism have no place in his value system, as one can deduce from his vantage point as a princeling, his educational background, his immersion in the crucible of Communist Party culture throughout his career, and the speeches he has given before and during his presidency. He said that “China does not export revolution” and that “people cannot deny what was done before the reform and opening-up based on what happened after it, and vice versa.” His administration exerted greater ideological control by circulating the “Seven Unmentionables” and Document No. 9.[2] All of this, along with Xi’s “August 19” speech,[3] visit to Hunan—Mao Zedong’s home province—and assuming the chairmanship of the National Security Commission—lays bare the new CPC Secretary General’s position and ambition. It’s thus time for public intellectuals to abandon any false hope for the regime’s change of heart. The Economist magazine was shrewd to call it like it is: they attired President Xi in a dragon robe on its cover. Yet even the clout of an emperor is nothing compared to the Maoist monopoly of power. Maoism, one-party rule, and the eternal dominance of the Red Communist Party over China are the universal truths for Xi. In fact, Xi’s belief is no different than that of his predecessor Hu Jintao, but Xi has greater motivation, prowess, confidence, and less restraint and hesitance in his action. This is already evident in the attack he already launched against the “Black Five”—right defense lawyers, underground churches, dissidents, leaders of online activism, and vulnerable groups. More important, in the eyes of the government and Party leadership, the failure to carry out “extraordinary deterrence” against and deliver destructive blows to civil society and opposition forces as represented by the “Black Five,” would present a “clear and present” threat to the so-called “people’s interests and social stability,” which in essence means the legitimacy and interests of the Party.
   
   Yet China’s civil society already possesses the foundation for self-regeneration and is capable of steady and healthy development. This, on the one hand, is the cumulative result of the Internet, marketization, globalization, legalization, growing citizenship consciousness, and social movements. On the other hand, it is a testimony to the current regime’s innate illegitimacy, the current system’s constant infringement on citizen’s rights and continuous conflicts and clashes with the people, the waning appeal of the current ideology, the continuous environmental degradation, and the continuous crises generated by the current development model. This is the larger context that has propelled China’s civil society forces and forces promoting freedom and democracy on an upward spiral, in a trend so powerful that it seems unstoppable despite the will of the Chinese leaders. The process will surely be a tortuous one, with setbacks, adversities, and sacrifices. More people will have to pay a heart-wrenching price, and bad news will reach us time and again. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind the larger sociopolitical context that I just described because the same crises that have prompted the Chinese government to adopt a new coping mechanism are also the very reason why this new approach will never succeed.

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