滕彪文集
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滕彪文集
·曾志豪:滕彪都站出來,你呢?
·June 2014: Remembering Tiananmen: The View from Hong Kong
·The Strength to Save Oneself
·讓北京知道 要甚麼樣的未來/苹果日报
·否認屠殺的言論自由?
·Beyond Stability Maintenance-From Surveillance to Elimination/Teng bia
·从稳控模式到扫荡模式
·為自由,免於恐懼越絕壑——記滕彪談中國維權路
·就律协点名维权律师“无照”执业 滕彪答德国之声记者问
·法官如何爱国?
·滕彪给全国律协的公开信
·郑州十君子公民声援团募款倡议书
·Politics of the Death Penalty in China
·What sustains Chinese truth-tellers
·在人权灾难面前不应沉默
·From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao
·自由不是一個禮物,而是一個任務
·抱薪救火的严打政策
·习近平要回到文革吗?
·中国宪法的结构性缺陷
·25 years later, Tiananmen cause is still costly
·A Chinese activist: Out of prison but not free
·中国人权有进步吗?
·Activist lawyer vows to keep fighting for human rights
·高智晟:走出监狱却没有自由
·VOA时事大家谈:维权/维稳
·和平香港行動呼籲
·沉默的吶喊
·Head Off a Tiananmen Massacre in Hong Kong/Yang jianli,Teng Biao,Hu ji
·滕彪被中国政法大学除名 因参与新公民运动
· Ilham Tohti should get the Nobel peace prize, not life in prison
·受难的伊力哈木
·香港人不会接受一个假选举
· Chinese activist scholar Teng Biao on how Occupy Central affects main
·大陆法律人关于支持港人真普选和释放大陆声援公民的声明
·« Révolution des parapluies » contre Pékin / Teng biao
·We Stand With You
·从占领中环到伞花革命
·不可承受的革命之重
·中国维权运动的历史和现状
·Don’t Get Too Excited About the Investigation of Zhou Yongkang
·Sensing subversion, China throws the book at kids' libraries
·China’s Unstoppable Lawyers: An Interview With Teng Biao
·专访滕彪:中国那些百折不回的律师们/纽约书评
·法治還是匪治
·努力实现匪治
·Hongkong: the Unbearable Weight of the Revolution
·Courts are told what decision to make in important cases
·RISKY BUSINESS fighting for Human Rights in China
·藏族、維吾爾族、南(内)蒙古族以及漢族活動人士的聯合聲明
·A STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY FROM A TIBETAN, UYGHUR, SOUTHERN MONGOLIAN,
·The Supremacy of the Constitution, and Freedom of Religion
·如果有人倾听你对 昨夜梦境的复述(诗四首)
·China’s Empty Promise of Rule by Law
·Sensing subversion, China throws the book at kids' libraries
·VOA时事大家谈:中国司法不独立,如何进行司法改革?
·VOA时事大家谈:通奸女官员被“游街”:罪有应得还是侵犯人权?
·滕彪:中共“依法治国”的画皮
·What will this crackdown on activists do to China’s nascent civil soc
·浦志强、滕彪:李保华诉周国平名誉权纠纷案代理词
·The most dangerous job in law
·关于撤销《黑龙江省垦区条例》的建议
·Selective Blindness over China and Huamn Rights
·中共体制是一个不定时的炸弹/VOA
·滕彪在伦敦闹市被打劫
·「西方學者自我審查問題嚴重」/BBC
·CHINA'S LONG ROAD TO DEATH PENALTY REFORM
·Blood, Justice and Corruption: Why the Chinese Love Their Death Penalt
·完善我国宪法人权保护条款的建议
·计生基本国策是完全错误的
·死刑作為政治籌碼
·Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China Intensifies Crackdown/NYT
·学者滕彪等人探望基督徒母亲被殴打/RFA
·‘Did We Stand on the Side of Tank Man?’
·The Quest to Save the World's Scholars From Persecution and Death
·北京准备出手整肃海内外NGO与学术界
·时事大家谈:中国新国安法,党国不分?
·Comments on the draft law on Foreign NGO Management
·评《境外非政府组织管理法》和《国家安全法》草案
·《回到革命》亮相香港书展
·China is moving toward a new totalitarianism
·Uncivil/ The Economist
·《回到革命》编选说明、封面设计说明
·习近平为何清洗人权律师
·Why Xi Jinping is Purging China’s Human Rights Lawyers
·CCP party has an exaggerated fear of a color revolution
·維權律師享受和集權者鬥爭樂趣
·Toast at the Stateless Breakfast
·"China é responsável por 90% das execuções mundiais"
·敗訴多於勝訴的名律師(上)
·敗訴多於勝訴的名律師(下)
·China's international relations at a time of rising rule of law challe
·Seven Chinese activists wrote to the Dutch King
·七名中国民主人士致信荷兰国王
·專訪維權律師滕彪對中國法治人權的解讀
·中共的政治株连
·Dictatorship is a Decapitator, Whether it Tortures You or Treats You W
·Innocence project movement in China rises to aid the wrongfully convic
·好處沙龍【選後台灣如何面對中國巨變】
·“你恐惧,中共的目的就达到了”
·SOME QUESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA TO ASK PRESIDENT XI
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From Stability Maintenance to Wiping Out/Teng biao


   http://www.hrichina.org/en/china-rights-forum/stability-maintenance-and-control-wiping-out
   
   July 25, 2014
   

   
   [Translation by Human Rights in China]
   
   The ongoing nationwide crackdown of activists in China has brought bad news every day. Within three weeks, more than 60 intellectuals and rights defenders have been detained. Among them are rights protection lawyers Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), Liu Shihui (刘士辉), and Tang Jinling (唐荆陵); pro-democracy rights defenders Hu Shigen (胡石根), Yuan Xinting (袁新亭), Wang Qingying (王清营), Master Shengguan (圣观法师), Xiucai Jianghu (秀才江湖), Xie Wenfei (谢文飞), Yang Chong (杨崇), and Jia Lingmin (贾灵敏); journalists Gao Yu(高瑜), Wu Wei (吴薇), Xiang Nanfu (向南夫), and辛建 (Xin Jian); scholars Xu Youyu (徐友渔) and Hao Jian (郝建); artist Xu Guang (徐光); as well as documentary producer Shen Yongping (沉勇平). There are also quite a few others who have gone missing.
   
   Some interpret this crackdown as an escalation of the authorities’ weiwen (stability maintenance) mechanism in anticipation of this year’s June Fourth anniversary. Some see it as a sign of the out-of-control misuse of police force and power by the political and legal system. Some others attribute it to the spillover of factional conflicts in the central government. I venture to disagree with all these views. The starting point of this wave of large-scale suppression of civil society is not the detention of the “Five Gentleman of May 3”[1] this year, but can be traced back to the detention of the “Four Gentlemen of Xidan” last year. On March 31, 2013, [the “Four Gentlemen”] Yuan Dong (袁冬), Zhang Baocheng (张宝成), and two others [Li Wei (李蔚) and Hou Xin (侯欣)] were taken away by police on the spot when they were giving a speech in the Xidan commercial area of Beijing calling for public disclosure of officials’ assets. This incident raised the curtain of the authorities’ crackdown on the New Citizens Movement and China’s civil society at large. Over the course of one year, more than 200 rights defenders around the country were taken into custody, including Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Wang Gongquan (王功权), Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄), Li Huaping (李化平), Chen Baocheng (陈宝成), Zhang Lin (张林), Ding Jiaxi (丁家喜), Liu Ping (刘萍), Yuan Fengchu (袁奉初), Ilham Tohti (伊力哈木), and many more. In particular, renowned rights defender Cao Shunli (曹顺利) was tormented to death by the authorities. The crackdown does not only target rights defenders. The suppression aimed at dissidents, underground churches, Falun Gong practitioners, petitioners, Internet activists, and liberal scholars has clearly intensified. And the control of information dissemination and ideology has clearly tightened.
   
   While this crackdown wave has not taken the form of that in the period of the Jasmine rallies of 2011—including large-scale abduction, secret detention, and torture (escalated emergency stability maintenance measures)—it has far exceeded the latter in terms of duration, area of impact, number of detainees, and severity of punishment.
   
   Ever since he took office, President Xi Jinping has made evident attempts at changing the approach to handling civil society. One can locate the starting point of this change in the 2013 “Four Gentlemen of Xidan” incident. In the course of the crackdown, in collecting information, observing civil society’s reactions, exploring and experimenting with new tactics, the authorities have continued to strengthen this new approach. One can call this change a transition “from the stability maintenance-and-control model to the rooting-out model,” or “from the control model to the wiping out model.” The new approach is by no means contingent in nature or incident-specific, but, rather, it is characterized by planning and procedure. Instead of specified individuals, it targets the entire civil society.
   
   Previously, the targets were those who crossed the red line, stood out, took to the street, or engaged in organized actions. Now, the trend seems to be netting everyone in one fell swoop. Everyone who is active, influential, and able to take actions may be on the target list. Being detained during a specific incident doesn’t mean that the incident is the reason for the detention. Rather, the detention waits for an excuse, an opportunity, to be carried out—as if it is settling old scores, once and for all. While the previous approach aimed to punish individual “line-crossers” and to maintain the superiority of the stability maintenance strength, the current practice is to eliminate all nodes of connectivity in civil society, nip all emerging civil society leaders in the bud, and completely destroy the capability of civil resistance. Since last spring, one can see from the large scale of detentions and the severity of the repression the authorities’ determination to eliminate civil society’s strength of resistance. Or at least check the momentum of Chinese civil society’s steady growth and quiet expansion over the past decade.
   
   Xi Jinping is not China’s Gorbachev, but the ideological heir of Maoism. Democracy and Constitutionalism have no place in his value system, as one can deduce from his vantage point as a princeling, his educational background, his immersion in the crucible of Communist Party culture throughout his career, and the speeches he has given before and during his presidency. He said that “China does not export revolution” and that “people cannot deny what was done before the reform and opening-up based on what happened after it, and vice versa.” His administration exerted greater ideological control by circulating the “Seven Unmentionables” and Document No. 9.[2] All of this, along with Xi’s “August 19” speech,[3] visit to Hunan—Mao Zedong’s home province—and assuming the chairmanship of the National Security Commission—lays bare the new CPC Secretary General’s position and ambition. It’s thus time for public intellectuals to abandon any false hope for the regime’s change of heart. The Economist magazine was shrewd to call it like it is: they attired President Xi in a dragon robe on its cover. Yet even the clout of an emperor is nothing compared to the Maoist monopoly of power. Maoism, one-party rule, and the eternal dominance of the Red Communist Party over China are the universal truths for Xi. In fact, Xi’s belief is no different than that of his predecessor Hu Jintao, but Xi has greater motivation, prowess, confidence, and less restraint and hesitance in his action. This is already evident in the attack he already launched against the “Black Five”—right defense lawyers, underground churches, dissidents, leaders of online activism, and vulnerable groups. More important, in the eyes of the government and Party leadership, the failure to carry out “extraordinary deterrence” against and deliver destructive blows to civil society and opposition forces as represented by the “Black Five,” would present a “clear and present” threat to the so-called “people’s interests and social stability,” which in essence means the legitimacy and interests of the Party.
   
   Yet China’s civil society already possesses the foundation for self-regeneration and is capable of steady and healthy development. This, on the one hand, is the cumulative result of the Internet, marketization, globalization, legalization, growing citizenship consciousness, and social movements. On the other hand, it is a testimony to the current regime’s innate illegitimacy, the current system’s constant infringement on citizen’s rights and continuous conflicts and clashes with the people, the waning appeal of the current ideology, the continuous environmental degradation, and the continuous crises generated by the current development model. This is the larger context that has propelled China’s civil society forces and forces promoting freedom and democracy on an upward spiral, in a trend so powerful that it seems unstoppable despite the will of the Chinese leaders. The process will surely be a tortuous one, with setbacks, adversities, and sacrifices. More people will have to pay a heart-wrenching price, and bad news will reach us time and again. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind the larger sociopolitical context that I just described because the same crises that have prompted the Chinese government to adopt a new coping mechanism are also the very reason why this new approach will never succeed.

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