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阿拉伯之春:突尼斯成功的革命

阿拉伯之春:突尼斯成功的革命

   

   郭国汀编译

   

   

   起因于2010年底世界粮食危机引发的广泛不满。2010年12月17日一名大学毕业后失业的青年穆罕默德(Mohammed Bouazzizi),由于城管粗暴地借口他没有合法营业执照没收了他的水果摊,因不堪忍受而自焚抗议身亡(阿里家族通过其夫人却通过控制经济大腐败贪污)。引发公众广泛同情,抗议自1991年以来的阿里政权的自发示威游行由当地的贸易联合会分支机构组织并得到律师界及记者的支持。迅速发展成一场全国要求阿里总统下台的声势浩大的社会运动。2011年1月14日阿里携家逃亡沙特,统治了突尼斯23年的阿里政权随之垮台,随后制定新的民主宪法。

   

   突尼斯革命的特点有如下几点:首先,阿里未摧毁突尼斯传统的自治组织,贸易联合会(GUTT)特别是其地方机构仍有相当行动自治;由律师、记者组成的全国人权组织the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme and, later, the Comité National des Libertés en Tunisie,虽然在1990年代受当局严重限制,亦起到了半公开的作用。其次,突尼斯有很强的宪政传统。在法国殖民当局尊守1881年条约,而突尼斯1860年即制定了阿拉伯世界第一部宪法。历来允许有限的政治多元化,因为担忧伊斯兰教势力过大1980年后许可世俗政党与政府合作。第三,突尼斯军队素来不干政,仅在1984年唯一一次应总统命令为恢复秩序(由于严重的粮食危机引发的社会动乱)。因此军队拒绝执行向示威民众开枪的命令。该政权的真正核心是theRCD 党,2011年2月6日突尼斯法院正式裁定解散该党,因此突尼斯革命取得了实质成功。

   

   

   Demonstrations in Tunisia began, asmentioned above, over the issue of

   the sudden escalation of food prices in late2010. The situation,

   however, was transformed by the self-immolation ofMohammed Bouazzizi

   on 17 December in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bou Zid, in

   response to the way in which he had been treated bythe local

   authorities after his fruit-and-vegetable stall was seized, ostensibly

   because he lacked the appropriate municipal licence.His personal

   sacrifice immediately came to symbolise the generalised popular

   disgust with the repressive contempt that the BenAli regime voiced

   towards its population, alongside widespread angerat the way in which

   the president's family, led by his wife, Leila Trabulsi, had plundered

   the Tunisian economy through its corrupt control of the private sector.

   Spontaneous demonstrations in sympathy with MohammedBouazzizi's

   action were soon taken in hand by local branches of the UGTT, together

   with representatives of lawyers associations andjournalists. They

   organised a series of rolling demonstrations around the country,

   culminating in major demonstrations in the capital Tunis, in protest

   against the regime's repressive policiessince 1991, when it had first

   turned on the country's Islamist movement, Annahda. Very rapidly the

   demonstrations coalesced around a demand for theremoval of the Ben

   Ali regime from power. On 14 January, thepresident stepped down and

   fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia, thus bringing his 23-year-long regime

   to an end. Subsequently, a lengthy denouement eventually saw the

   single political party, the Rassemblement Culturelle et Démocratique

   (RCD), dismantled and a complex process for drawing up a new

   democratic constitution begin.

   

   

   There are several aspects to this narrative that are worthy of note.

   Firstis the fact that there were clearly traditions ofautonomous

   expression in Tunisia whichhad not been crushed by the Ben Ali

   regime. The trade union movement, the UGTT,is one for, although its

   central administration was repeatedly disciplined by the regime, both

   under President Habib Bourguiba and under the Ben Ali regime, its

   local branches preserved a considerable degree ofautonomy of action.

   Alongside this were the country's human rightsorganisations – the

   Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme and, later, the Comité National

   des Libertés en Tunisie which, although emasculated in the 1990s,

   nonetheless continued to play a semi-clandestinerole. It was

   buttressed by lawyers, independent journalists and,later by bloggers

   and internet journalists.[1]

   

   

   Secondly,there is a very strong tradition ofconstitutionalism in

   Tunisia; all the country's major political movements,from the start

   of the twentieth century onwards – the Destour, the Neo-Destour, the

   Parti Socialiste Destourien and the RCD – derive their legitimacy from

   the fact that they claim their origins in a movement – the Destour

   (‘Constitution’) – set up to persuade the Frenchoccupying authorities

   to honour both the terms of the Treaty of La Bardo which introduced

   the French Protectorate in 1881 and theTunisian Constitution,

   promulgated in 1860 and the first constitution inthe Arab world. This

   tradition always hindered the regime from being as repressive as it

   would have liked to be and made sure that it took care to allow

   limited political pluralism, provided that this never threatened the

   hegemony of the RCD. Indeed the secular political parties that were

   permitted after 1980 often collaborated withthe regime because of

   their fear of Islamism.[2]

   It was when the presidency breached this principleof formal

   constitutionality, by altering the constitution in order to allow the

   incumbent to stand for more than two terms and instituting a bicameral

   parliamentary assembly to entrench RCD control that its support-base

   began to fragment, as had its predecessor's over similar issues in the

   1980s.[3]

   Thirdly,although the regime had ensured its hegemonyby the social

   coalitions it had made and by its control of the security services, it

   had also traditionally marginalised the Tunisian army to ensure that

   it could never be a threat. Thus the army had onlytaken part in

   political affairs once in 1984 when it was brought in by President

   Bourguiba to restore order after severe food riots. Otherwise its

   officers were profoundly apolitical and were neverencouraged to take

   part in political affairs, even within the RCD which was, effectively,

   Tunisia's single political party. In parallel with this, internal

   security duties were undertaken by the policeand the security

   services which were increasingly used to cow the population and

   dissuade it from political engagement. For the Tunisian middle class,

   this meant that economic prosperity wasoffered as an alternative,

   whilst the impoverished working class and the peasantry was, when

   needed, repressed. There was, after all, the spectre of what had

   happened in the early 1990s to remind the population of regime power

   and determination. Then the country's Islamist movement, An-Nahda, had

   been brutally dismantled after it had tried to participate in the

   pluralistic polity that the Ben Ali regime had promised in 1989, just

   after it had come to power.

   It was, therefore, hardly surprising that, once Mohammed Bouazzizi's

   spectacular self-sacrifice had become the catalyst, transforming the

   anger over economic deprivation into politicalprotest, that there

   were organisations ready and able to create apowerful social movement

   out of the popular disgust at regimecorruption and repression and

   targeted at removing it. Interestingly enough, however, the initial

   target was the president and his family, not the massive structure of

   the RCD which was the real core of the regime.And, even more

   striking, it was because the regime had alwaysexcluded the Tunisian

   army from a political role that it finally collapsed, for the army

   refused to fire on demonstrators when ordered to do so and, in the

   face of the evidence of the inability of the policeand security

   forces to control the demonstrations, it was the RCD leadership itself

   that decided that, to preserve its own power, thepresident and his

   family had to be sacrificed. Only then did the demonstrators turn

   their anger against the RCD as it tried to hang onto power. There

   ensued a lengthy tussle between continuing demonstrations and the

   party, as the latter tried to reconstruct government under its

   control. It was only on 6 February 2011, three weeks after the

   president had been deposed, that the party itselfwas formally

   dissolved by a Tunisian court and the Tunisian revolution had achieved

   its primary objective, the dissolution of a regime that had been

   effectively in power since independence in 1956.

   

   [1] Alexander,op.cit; pp. 64–65.

   

   [2] Alexander,op.cit; p. 66.

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