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·郭國汀評論第五十四集阿富漢共產黨暴政的罪孽
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·郭国汀评论第五十八集:人民為敵的蘇聯共產黨暴政的罪孽(一)
·郭国汀评论第六十二集:与人民为敌的苏联共产党暴政的罪孽
·郭国汀评论第六十三集:与人民为敌的苏联共产党暴政的罪孽
·郭国汀评论第六十四集:与人民为敌的苏联共产党暴政的罪孽
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***(22)《仗剑走天涯》郭国汀著
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***(23)《郭国汀自传》郭国汀著
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·《郭国汀自传》第二章:灭顶之灾
·《郭国汀自传》第三章:奋力拚搏
·《郭国汀自传》第四章:东山再起
·《郭国汀自传》第五章:山重水复
·《郭国汀自传》第六章:永恒的中国心
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阿拉伯之春埃及部分成功的革命

阿拉伯之春埃及部分成功的革命

   

   郭国汀编译

   

   

   Egypt:a partial success?

   

   

   The Arab Spring in North Africa origins andprospects

   George Jofféa*

   

   The Journal of North African Studies Volume 16, Issue 4, 2011 pages 507-532

   

   

   

   埃及人对当局不满始于2004年穆巴拉克总统图谋连任第六任为期五年的总统,且极力想传位于其子,为此穆于2010年游说美国支持让其子继任总统。抗议的催化剂似乎是一个德高重的法学家号召人民抗议总统的连任及传位于子的计划。2005年总统选举,一个新政党领袖AymanNour竞争失败后被捕,中产阶级对此极为反感。2006年纺织工人大罢工,当局妥协让步,随后爆发了更多的罢工,当局强行镇压,却引发暴乱。2010年发生两件事件,使埃及革命推翻穆巴拉克政权呼之欲出。亚历山大市一名青年KhaledMohamed Saeed被两名秘密警察从咖啡网巴拖出活活打死,在迪拜的谷歌技术人员WaelGhonim在脸书上设立了一个悼念Khaled的网页引起众多同情同时激怒了埃及人民;几天后原任国际原子能主席的MohamedEl-Barade'i在亚历山大领导了一场悼念游行示威,同时在开罗广场亦举行了第一次示威游行。加之人们对粮食危机引发的物价爆涨不满,恰好突尼斯革命总统被迫出逃沙特,进一步催化了埃及革命。埃及政体性质属‘自由的专制’,或‘不自由的民主’,此种含部分自由的政治体制始创于1974年萨达特政权,允许政党存在,且存在三万余个非政府组织,尽管当局时常骚扰。因而埃及存在部分自由的空间。因此,在这次阿拉伯之春革命中,尽管当局暴力镇压,但英勇的埃及人民仅两周便迫使总统下台,但由于革命派缺乏实力,而军方撑控实权,埃及革命目前仅成功了一半,自由民主化的埃及还有艰难的道路。

   

   

   The creation of a liberalised autocracy inEgypt really goes back to

   the decision by President Sadat toboth open the Egyptian economy to

   private investment in the infitah programme and to seek new coalition

   partners to ensure domestic peace as Egypt renewed its ties with the

   West after 1973. The result was a tacit alliance between the regime

   and the Muslim Brotherhood by which the latter waspermitted to

   reassert itself within Egyptian society, although not given legal

   status, and the growth of a private sector allied to the regime by

   economic interest. At the same time, the Sadatregime allowed formal

   political parties to enter the political scene, although they were

   never able to seriously challenge the regime's own party, the National

   Democratic Party. In effect, therefore, the Sadat regimeabandoned the

   total hegemony that its predecessor, the Nassir regime, had exercised

   over the state. In its place the Sadat regime hadcreated a

   liberalised autocracy which its successorunder, Hosni Mubarak, was to

   continue.[1]

   The Mubarak regime was also to engagein the wholesale privatisation

   of the Egyptian economy, a project involving 312 state enterprises,

   mainly in the Delta, which brought increased inflows of foreign

   investment as well as the growth of domestic investment but did not

   lead to rises in living standards. The regime was also loathe to risk

   significant political liberalisation,preferring instead to

   marginalise or incapacitate autonomous organisations that it perceived

   as threats. Thus Saad Eddin Ibrahim's Ibn Khaldun Centre in Cairo was

   shut down and its personnel, including the director, imprisoned for

   having accepted funding from the European Union, ostensibly because it

   had not had official permission to do so, in June 2000. Nonetheless,

   by the beginning of the new century, Egypt had some30,000

   organisations contesting its partially liberalised public space. The

   Muslim Brotherhood remained formally proscribed and periodicallyits

   leadership was arrested. Human rights activists were continually

   persecuted and Egyptian elections were habitually rigged amidst scenes

   of widespread violence.

   Out of these variegated strands of frustration, however, there emerged

   a pattern of conscious resistance to the regime. It began in 2004

   amongst the urban middle class, particularlyin Cairo, as a result of

   President Mubarak's desire for an unprecedented fifth six-year term as

   president and his apparent intention to make his son, Gamal, his

   successor. The catalyst seems to have been a call from a highly

   respected jurist, Tariq al-Bishri, who called forcivil disobedience

   in protest at the president's plans. Hosni Mubarak's presidential

   ambitions were challenged in the election in 2005, unsuccessfully of

   course, by Ayman Nour, the leader of Ghad, a newpolitical party, who

   was subsequently imprisoned on trumped-up charges for his pains.

   Middle class disgust at this abuse of officialpower led to the

   formation of a new kind of political movement, Kefiya (‘Enough!’),

   drawing its strength from a group of small opposition parties and

   diverse movements, all united by their anger at the misuse of the

   electoral process. The movement also used moderninformation

   technology to communicate with its members, thus demonstrating that,

   even if it did not have the resources of the Muslim Brotherhood,

   effective widespread peaceful opposition to theregime was possible.

   Although the movement eventually collapsed,partly because of its

   middle class character and its essential opposition to the Muslim

   Brotherhood, as well as because of regime action against it, it was a

   valuable lesson in the potential of informal but structured opposition

   to the regime.[2]

   Then, in December 2006, a major strike erupted in atextile factory in

   Mahalla al-Kubra, a large industrial town in the Delta. Strikes which

   are not authorised by the state-run Egyptian trade union confederation

   were illegal in Egypt but this strike was organisedby an unofficial

   body, the Independent Textile Workers' League. Yet, contrary to its

   usual practice, the regime did not force theworkers back to work but

   conceded the workers' demands. The result was a growing crescendo of

   strikes over succeeding years until, on 6 April 2008, the regime did

   crack down on striking textile workers in the town, causing a major

   riot instead. Out of this event grew theApril 6 Movement, bringing

   together workers and youth and spreadinginformation about resistance

   throughout the country. The new movement managed to resist attempts by

   the regime to suppress it, largely because of its amorphous nature and

   its use of new means of communication, such asmobile telephones and

   the internet. It thus became another, more generalised strand in the

   growing resistance to the Mubarak regime.

   Two events in 2010 completed this picture ofgrowing resistance to the

   Mubarak regime; the killing of Khaled Mohamed Saeed in Alexandria in

   June 2010 and the advent of Mohamed El-Barade'i on the Egyptian

   political scene, after his term as head ofthe International Atomic

   Energy Authority ended in November 2009. Thedeath of Khaled Mohamed

   Saeed was particularly egregious since he had beendragged out of an

   internet café in Alexandria by two securityagents and beaten to

   death. The incident became a public scandalwhen Wael Ghonim, a Google

   marketing executive in Dubai, created a Facebook page in his honour

   which received enormous public support. Some days after his death,

   Mohamed El-Barade'i led a massive march inAlexandria in his memory

   and the first protests took place in Tahrir Squarein Cairo.

   Thus, by the start of 2011, there were three strands of protest in

   operation which engaged broad swathes of the Egyptian population,

   alongside the growing discontent over rising foodand energy prices.

   In this context, the events in Tunisia seem to have acted as a

   catalyst, especially as Zine El-Abdine BenAli had just been forced

   from power. The opportunity seems to have been seized by a small group

   of activists in the April 6 Movement who, drawing on their links with

   the Kefaya Movement, the El-Ghad political party and the Khaled

   Mohamed Said movement, planned a demonstration in Tahrir Square in

   Cairo on 25 January 2011, the day whichcommemorates a massacre of 50

   Egyptian policemen by British occupation troops in Ismailia in 1952.

   Their success in resisting police attemptsto crush the demonstration

   led to much larger demonstrations three days later, on 28 January

   after Friday prayers, which really set the revolutionary ball rolling

   in a series of continuous demonstrations focused around Tahrir Square

   in Cairo but involving millions outside the capital as well.

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