大家
[发表评论] [查看此文评论]    郭国汀律师专栏
[主页]->[大家]->[郭国汀律师专栏]->[当代中国的盖世太宝[610办公室]研究(英文)]
郭国汀律师专栏
***(4)英国协会保险运费、战争、罢工险保险条款英中对译
·1982年1月1日协会货物罢工险条款/郭国汀译
·1995年11月1日协会船舶营运费用和增值定期保险条款/郭国汀译
·1995年11月1日协会船舶战争险和罢工险条款/郭国汀译
·The Practice of Marine Insurance: Marine Insurance Policy Forms
·1982年1月1日协会货物战争险保险条款/郭国汀译
·1995年11月1日协会船舶运费定期保险条款/郭国汀译
·1995年11月1日协会运费定期战争和罢工险条款/郭国汀译
·1996年1月1日协会运费共同海损-污染费用保险条款/郭国汀译
***(5)《CIF 和 FOB 合同》第四版 郭国汀主译校
·《cif与fob合同》序
·《cif与fob合同》译后记
·郭国汀译《CIF 和FOB合同》读后
·《CIF和 FOB合同》第四版 郭国汀主译校
·《CIF 和 FOB合同》郭国汀主译校 第二章 装运
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第四章 保险(王崇能译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第五章 交单和付款(高建平译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第六章 法律救济(梅欢雪译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第七章 冲突法(黄辉译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第八章 各种类型的FOB合同(陈真,王崇能,黄辉,郭国汀译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第九章 FOB交付(蔡仲翰译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十章 FOB价格条款
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十一章 付款与接受(王力耘译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十二章保险 (李小玲译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十三章 法律救济(李小玲译)
·〈CIF 和 FOB 合同〉郭国汀主译校 第十四章 法律冲突(王力耘译)
***(6)《Scrutton 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》序
·我为法学翻译辩护- 《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》译后记 
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第一章:合同的性质、效力与解释
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第二章:合同当事人
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译、朱曾杰校 第三章:代理
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第四章:租船合同
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译、朱曾杰校 第五章:作为合同的提单
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第六章:租船合同项下货物的提单
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第七章:合同条款
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第八章:陈述
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第九章:合同的履行:装船
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十章:提单作为物权凭证
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十一章:船东对承运贷物的灭失或损坏之责任
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十二章:合同的履行:航次租船
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十三章:合同的履行:卸货
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十四章:滞期费
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十五章:运费
·《SCRUTTON租船合同与提单》郭国汀译、朱曾杰校 第十六章:定期租船
·《Scrutton on 租船合同与提单》郭国汀译朱曾杰校 第十七章:联运提单,联合运输,集装箱
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十八章:留置权
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第十九章:损害赔偿
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第二十章:1971年〈海上货物运输法〉
·〈SCRUTTON 租船合同与提单〉郭国汀译 朱曾杰校 第二十一章:管辖权与诉讼时效
***(7)《Omay 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译校
·王海明序《Omay 海上保险的法律与保险单》
·《OMAY海上保险的法律与保险单》序
·《Omay 海上保险:法律与保险单》译后记
·朱曾杰序《OMAY海上保险的法律与保险单》
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第一章:导论
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第二章:海上保险
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第三章:船舶险I
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第四章:船舶险II
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第五章:货物风险
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第六章:货物除外责任
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第七章:碰撞责任
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第八章:战争险
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第九章:罢工、暴乱和民事骚乱
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十章:近因
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十一章:施救费用
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十二章:共同海损
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十三章:救助
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十四章:全损\实际全损
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十五章:单独海损
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十六章:代位追偿权
·《OMAY 海上保险:法律与保险单》郭国汀主译 冯立奇校 第十七章:重复保险与分摊
***(8)《郭国汀辩护词代理词自选集》郭国汀著
·《郭国汀辩护词、代理词自选》
·“五懂”律师多多益善--《郭国汀律师辩护词、代理词精选》序
·张思之 他扬起了风帆——序《郭国汀辩护词代理词自选集》
·张凌序《郭国汀辩护词、代理词自选》
***(9)《郭国汀海事海商论文自选》郭国汀著
·《郭国汀海商法论文自选》
***(10)《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能译郭国汀审校
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译郭国汀审校 第一章:当事人的目标
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第六章:保险问题
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第四章:信用(融资)协议
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第十章:未来
·《项目融资》郭国汀 许兆宁 高建平 王崇能 译 第八章:其他法律问题
***(11)《油污和碰撞责任》郭国汀译
·《油污和碰撞责任》郭国汀译 第三编:油污 第十一章:导论
·《油污和碰撞责任》郭国汀译 第三编:油污 第十二章:船舶油污及国际公共卫生法的调整
[列出本栏目所有内容]
欢迎在此做广告
当代中国的盖世太宝[610办公室]研究(英文)

本文是一位英国法学硕士的研究论文,此文对610的研究相当全面具体,作为一个老外殊属不易。亦足令中国法律人(包括南郭)汉颜,因为迄今中国无人对此现象进行深入系统研究。
   610办公室完全是个法外的非法组织,但中共却可随心所欲烂用民膏民脂,在全国范内上至中央,下至县镇设立旨在逮捕、酷刑折磨、强制转化法轮功学员的特务机构;610办公室是中共践踏法律的最新例证,法轮功实质上完全不受中国法律保护;中共法院实质上业已堕落成中共的帮凶。610办公室的存在,再次印证了在中共主导下,决无任何可能实现法治,更无任何可能有所谓司法公正。
   BY Sarah Cook Law and Governance in the Developing World School of Oriental and African Studies 2 July 2007

   
   Inside a Secret Bureau:
   Institutional Analysis of China's '610-Office'
   
   "The 610 office is just like Hitler's Gestapo. They are powerful and they [have] got enough financial support from the government so …they secretly control all the FG practitioners in their local areas." – Guo Guoting, Chinese human rights lawyer in exile[1]
   
   I. Introduction
   From the Gestapo to the Stasi, special police task forces have become a trademark of authoritarian governance, but little is often known about their specifics. How is such an institution born? How are its powers defined? Where does it get funding and recruits? ? Is it created anew or founded on existing structures? These are of the questions this essay will consider through the contemporary case study of the 610-Office, a little known bureau established by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders to head a persecution campaign against the Falun Gong (FG) spiritual practice.
   Drawing on media reports, internal CCP documents, and testimonies by Chinese lawyers, prisoners of conscience, and a former police officer, this essay seeks to construct an institutional analysis of the 610-Office. Section II will provide a brief overview of FG, the campaign against it and relevant scholarly literature. Section III will analyze the bureau's creation, legal status and mandate. It will argue that the 610-Office is an extra-legal entity, established by decree and awarded wide-ranging powers to eradicate FG. Section IV will examine the functions carried out by the 610-Office, both directly and indirectly. In particular, this section will consider the bureau's relationship to other state institutions, including its ability to instruct courts, prisons, schools, and work units on issues related to FG. Section V will then outline the office's structure and Section VI will address the institution's sources of funding and staff. The final section will summarize the study's findings, examine their implications for legal reform in China, and present topics for future research.
   
   II. Background and Literature Review
   
   Few outside of China had heard of FG before 1999, but in the Mainland, people practiced it in parks across the country throughout the 1990s. The discipline, also known as Falun Dafa, is a form of qigong, a type of traditional Chinese exercise system. The practice consists of four slow-moving exercises and meditation, as well as spiritual teachings. These revolve around the belief that "Truthfulness-Compassion-Tolerance" is the fundamental principle of the universe and that practitioners should strive to align their thoughts, speech and behavior with these values.[2] FG was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi in 1992 and until 1999 became increasingly popular among people of diverse ages and socioeconomic backgrounds, including CCP officials. By 1998, the Chinese government estimated that there were at least 70 million FG adherents in China.
    The fast growing popularity of a group with a moral code independent of the Party aroused the suspicion of then-CCP leader Jiang Zemin, who viewed it was a threat to his power. In July 1999, he banned the practice and gave an order to eradicate FG. Large scale arrests began immediately and coordinators were sentenced to long prison terms.[3] A massive propaganda campaign was launched that vilified and dehumanized FG adherents. Human rights groups have since documented more than 3,000 deaths[4] and over 40,000 cases of torture, though many experts say the numbers are much higher.[5] At the time of writing, hundreds of thousands of FG adherents remain in labor camps and reports of death from torture continue to emerge on a regular basis.[6]
   The vast majority of scholarly literature about FG and the campaign against it has focused on what FG is and why the CCP banned it. Nonetheless, a number of pieces have considered the legal aspects of the persecution and can be divided into two groups. The first addresses the campaign against FG within a broader analysis of Chinese legal reform and the potential of establishing rule of law. These authors cite FG as a shortcoming in the system, but one that does not undermine the generally optimistic view that China is in a transition towards rule of law. For instance, in concluding a case study on FG, Peerenboom writes that "the way in which the crackdown was conducted undoubtedly violates any credible interpretation of rule of law."[7] Nonetheless, fifty pages later, he states that "China is in the process of more fully realizing the ideal of rule of law."[8]
   The other category of literature on FG is more pessimistic, analyzing the persecution's illegality. This group argues that the campaign against FG demonstrates that China remains a state in which "the ruling Communist elite may use law to enforce its policies, but the elite class itself is not easily constrained by law,"[9] a system otherwise known as "rule by law." As such, Edelman and Richardson, argue that the "PRC government acted outside of its constitutional authority, violated citizens' basic rights and overstepped its own boundaries in its war against FG."[10] Similarly, the legal analysis in a Human Rights Watch report (HRW) describes a "rule of law" veneer used by the CCP to give the persecution a semblance of legality, a veneer that included ex post facto legislation.[11] Several Chinese writers have taken their interpretation a step further, maintaining that the campaign "raises doubts about the credibility of the Party's avowed effort at creating a government under the rule of law rather than rule of man,[12]" a term often used to refer to the law's status during Mao Zedong's time when policy was outlined and implemented through top leaders' informal directives.
    This body of literature has therefore focused primarily on the "law" aspects of the campaign, while to a large extent neglecting the "governance" side, of which the 610-Office is a key component. Several authors have briefly mentioned the existence of the 610-Office,[13] while others have omitted it all together.[14] Nonetheless, to date there has been no scholarly analysis of its structure, powers or role as a state institution.[15] Indeed, there has been very little consideration in the academic literature of the mechanisms of persecution at all.[16] This essay is a modest attempt to begin filling this gap and to contribute to the factual foundation on which to base broader discussions of Chinese legal reforms.
   
   III. Creation, Legal Status and Mandate
   
   Though multiple incidents targeting FG occurred between 1996 and 1999, it was on April 25, 1999 - following a large-scale peaceful protest by adherents in Beijing - that Jiang Zemin reportedly decided to ban the practice.[17] In preparation for the ban, Jiang and the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC) decided to create a special task force to coordinate the campaign. In a speech he gave to top CCP leaders on June 7, 1999, Jiang spoke of the agency's creation and responsibilities:
   The central committee has already agreed to let comrade Li Lanqing be responsible for establishing a leadership group that will deal with problems of "FG" specifically. … After the leading group dealing with "FG" problems is established by the Central Committee of the CCP, it should immediately organize forces, find out "FG"'s organization system nationwide ASAP, constitute the battling strategies, [and] get fully prepared for the work of disintegrating [FG].[18]

[下一页]

©Boxun News Network All Rights Reserved.
所有栏目和文章由作者或专栏管理员整理制作,均不代表博讯立场